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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT FEATHERHAT
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Criminal No. 051500011
Appellate Case No. 20090387
Judge: G. Michael Westfall

BRYAN FEATHERHAT,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this case originates in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78a-3-102 (3)(i)(1953, as amended), in that it involves
convictions of criminal charges which are first degree felonies. On or about the 12th day
of May, 2009, Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42(a), of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition
which was received without objection by the parties.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows:
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether or not the jury was adequately and properly instructed
and does it qualify under plain error as a manifest in justice exception?
ISSUE No. 2: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion
to suppress?
ISSUE No. 3: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support the
conviction of aggravated robbery?
ISSUE No. 4: Whether or not the Appellant received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial?
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to
questions of law and the interpretation of statute and the standard is "clearly erroneous"
as it applies to questions of fact, State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, at paragraph 17; and State
v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT49, at paragraphs 11 and 12. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774 and State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App 1991) and also State v. Gibbons,
770 P.2d 1133 (Utah App 1989) and State v. Girrard, 574 P.2d 885 (Utah App 1978).
In assessing a claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict, the
Supreme Court sustains unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence or if it
reaches a definite or firm conviction that a mistake has been made, State v. Briggs,
2008 UT 83, at paragraph 11; see also, State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (UT 1988)
(quoting State v. Walker 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). The Supreme Court reviews
for clear error the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to deny a motion
to suppress. Whether the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress, however,
is a legal conclusion that it views for correctness, State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63 at
paragraph 5. See also, State v. Kurkowski, 2004 UT 94, at paragraph 15 P.3d 1222 and
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, at paragraph 15, 103 P.3d 699. Where claims are not
preserved the Supreme Court reviews only for plain error. To prevail an Appellant must
demonstrate that (i) the error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court and; (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome. State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, at paragraph 17; see also
State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, at paragraph 26, 128 P.3d 1179 (quoting State v. Haqson,
2004 UT 99, at paragraph 10, 108 P.3d 6957. Regarding a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court reviews for correctness the trial court's
2

application of law to the facts. It defers to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly
erroneous but remains free to make an independent determination of the trial court's
legal conclusions. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at paragraph 37. The right to counsel
embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a right to the
effective assistance of counsel. A defendant is deprived of this right when his counsel's
conduct so undermines the proper function of the adversarial process that the
proceedings cannot be relied on in having produced a just result. Ineffective assistance
of counsel is proven when performance is so deficient as to fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness and except for such deficient performance there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. at
paragraph 68; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive and believes
the following apply:
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-202 (1953, as amended)
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:...
(c) the actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim and
the actor;...
(f) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the
defendant or another by a peace officer acting under color of legal authority of for the
purpose of effecting the defendant's or another's escape from lawful custody.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-205.5 (1953, as amended)
(1) Special mitigation exists when the actor causes the death of another or attempts to
cause the death of another:
(a) (i) under circumstances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts under a
delusion attributable to a mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305;
(ii) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the defendant believed
them to be in the delusional state, those facts would provide a legal justification for the
defendant's conduct; and
(iii) the defendant's actions, in light of the delusion, were reasonable from the objective
3

viewpoint of a reasonable person; or
(b) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse.
(2) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or
ingested alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged
offense may not claim mitigation of the offense under Subsection (1)(a) on the basis of
mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, triggered, or substantially contributed
to the mental illness.
(3) Under Subsection (1)(b), emotional distress does not include:
(a) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or
(b) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.
(4) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (1)(b) shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing
circumstances.
(5) (a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in Subsection (5)(b) are
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation
under this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall return a
verdict on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5)(b).
(b) If under Subsection (5)(a) the offense is:
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of murder;
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of
attempted murder;
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of manslaughter; or
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of attempted
manslaughter.
(6) (a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the jury is required to establish the
existence of the special mitigation.
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return a verdict on
the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5).
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special mitigation has not been established,
it shall convict the defendant of the greater offense for which the prosecution has
established all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
(d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether or not special mitigation has been
established, the result is a hung jury.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-302 (1953, as amended)
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-16a-102 (1953, as amended)
(1) If a defendant asserts a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall
instruct the jury that it may find the defendant:
(a) guilty;
(b) guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense;
4

(c) guilty of a lesser offense;
(d) guilty of a lesser offense and mentally ill at the time of the offense;
(e) not guilty by reason of insanity; or
(f) not guilty.
(2) (a) When a defendant asserts a mental defense pursuant to Section 76-2-305 or
asserts special mitigation reducing the level of an offense pursuant to Subsection 76-5205.5(1 )(a), or when the evidence raises the issue and either party requests the
instruction, the jury shall be instructed that if it finds a defendant guilty by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of any changed offense or lesser included offense, it shall also return a
special verdict indicating whether it finds that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of
the offense.
(b) If the jury finds the defendant guilty of the charged offense by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and by special verdict finds the defendant was mentally ill at the time
of the offense, it shall return the general verdict of "guilty and mentally ill at the time of the
offense."
(c) If the jury finds the defendant guilty of a lesser offense by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and by special verdict finds the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the
offense, it shall return the general verdict of "guilty of a lesser offense and mentally ill at
the time of the offense."
(d) If the jury finds the defendant guilty of the charged offense or a lesser included
offense and does not find that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense,
the jury shall return a verdict of "guilty" of that offense, along with the special verdict form
indicating that the jury did not find the defendant mentally ill at the time of the offense.
(e) The special verdict shall be returned by the jury at the same time as the general
verdict, to indicate the basis for its general verdict.
(3) In determining whether a defendant should be found guilty and mentally ill at the time
of the offense, the jury shall be instructed that the standard of proof applicable to a
finding of mental illness is by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury shall also be
instructed that the standard of preponderance of the evidence does not apply to the
elements establishing a defendant's guilt, and that the proof of the elements establishing
a defendant's guilt of any offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case where the Appellant was
charged with attempted aggravated murder in violation of Utah Code Annotated,
Section 76-5-202 (1953, as amended) and aggravated robbery, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 76-6-302 (1953, as amended). The Appellant was charged
also with theft, a second degree felony but this was later dismissed in the amended
information. It was considered as one o f t
The lesser included offenses on the general verdict form. It was alleged that on
or about the 5th day of January, 2007, an officer stopped to assist Appellant whose
5

vehicle was stuck in a snow bank. Another vehicle was attempting to help Appellant get
it with a tow chain. The Appellant had been drinking and perhaps fearful he would be
arrested, shot officer Jason Thomas. He allegedly did it with a pistol grip a 12-gauge
shotgun although neither witness from the assisting vehicle saw what happened. The
officer testified that the Appellant shot him at close range in the chest and fired a
second shot hitting him in the head, shoulder and back as he tried to take cover. The
Appellant then removed the tow chain and fled in the vehicle of those assisting. The
vehicle was recovered abandoned in Cedar Valley. The Appellant was later seen
walking north along Old Highway 91 in the early morning some distance from the
scene. As they were searching for him, police officers searched the home of his parents
where he was staying. They did so without obtaining a warrant, relying upon the
claimed consent given by Appellant's father. When the Appellant was picked up and in
response to questions from the arresting officer, he made admissions. He asked how
he, presumably meaning the officer, was doing. He claimed to have been seeing things
and hearing voices. The Appellant was arrested and a preliminary hearing was held on
the 3rd day of April, 2007. He was bound over on each offense and later pled not guilty
to the charges. In November, 2007, counsel for Appellant moved to suppress evidence
and an evidentiary hearing was held on the 14th day of January, 2008. Thereafter, the
parties submitted points and authorities and the trial court rendered its order granting in
part and denying in part Appellant's motion to suppress. The same was entered on or
about the 30th day of July, 2008. In August, the Appellant through his appointed counsel
gave notice of intent to claim diminished capacity and a mental health assessment was
conducted by doctors Richard Wootton and Tim Kockler who were appointed as
alienists. Each found the Appellant competent to stand trial and both noted mental
6

illness complicated by the use of alcohol. Dr. Wootton found the Appellant likely met the
standard for guilty and mentally ill. The case went to trial in November, 2008 After three
days, a verdict was returned of guilty to attempted aggravated murder and aggravated
robbery, each a first-degree felony. The Appellant did not testify at trial. The trial court
refused to give a jury instruction submitted by counsel for Appellant on mitigation but
submitted a special jury verdict form to consider guilty and mentally ill. The general
verdict form provided an alternative to consider, not guilty by reason of insanity. A
presentence investigation report was compiled recommending that the Appellant be
committed to the Utah State Prison. The matter came before the trial court on the 20th
day of January, 2009. The judge entered judgment, findings, sentence and commitment
on the 17th day of March, 2009. See the record at 482-485; see also Exhibit A,
Addendum attached. In February, 2009, the Appellant sent a letter to the trial court
which appeared to be a notice of appeal but was sufficiently unclear to require his
return and have new counsel appointed. To the extent that Appellant's attempt was to
request a new trial, the same was withdrawn by Appellant in open court and notice of
appeal was filed on or about the 19th day of February, 2009.
B. COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION at TRIAL: The Appellant
was arrested the day after the incident in the early morning hours. He was interrogated
about an hour after his arrest. His bedroom at the home of his parents was searched
prior to arrest. A preliminary hearing was conducted on or about the 3rd day of April,
2007, and he was bound over on the original charges. A motion to suppress was filed in
November, 2007, and an evidentiary hearing was conducted on or about the 14th day of
January, 2008. Points and authorities were submitted by the attorneys of record and the
trial court judge entered his decision and order granting in part and denying in part
7

Appellant's motion to suppress on or about the 30 day of July, 2008. See the record at
265-287; see also Exhibit B, Addendum attached. Notice of intent to claim diminished
capacity was filed in August, 2008, and an order requiring the Department of Human
Services to examine the Appellant and investigate his mental condition was filed on or
about the 18th day of August, 2008. Counsel stipulated to a jury verdict form consistent
with the amended information filed at the time of trial which considered as an additional
alternative for each charge not guilty by reason of insanity. It would consider on a
special verdict form guilty and mentally ill. A three-day jury trial was held in November,
2008 and the jury returned a verdict of guilty to each count. There was provision made
for lesser offenses. The Appellant was sentenced on or about the 20th day of January,
2009. However, the judgment, findings, sentence and commitment was not filed until
the 17th day of March, 2009. Appellant withdrew his motion for new trial and appeal was
filed in February, 2009. The Appellant is presently incarcerated on the charges pending
on appeal.
STATEMENT of FACTS
1. On or about the 5th day of January, 2007, officer Jason Thomas stopped to
assist a stalled motorist. Two vehicles were pulled to the side of the road and it
appeared that one was attempting to tow the other or pull it out from a snow bank.
Officer Thomas first spoke with the Appellant, the driver of the stalled motor vehicle and
collected his personal information. See the record at 3. He apparently had been
drinking. See trial transcript, volume 2, pages 144 to 146, in the record at 506. The
other vehicle was occupied by two adults and three children. It was actually the
Appellant's cousin, her children with her boyfriend in his truck that were assisting. Id at
page 67. As the officer assisted, the Appellant allegedly retrieved a 12-guage shotgun
8

from his vehicle and shot the officer at close range in the chest. See the record at 3.
The officer had on body armor. He retreated for cover and in the course of doing so, a
second shot was fired hitting him in the head, shoulder, and back. Id.
2. Those in the assisting vehicle heard the shots and ran to a nearby field. See
trail transcript, volume 2 and pages 68, 73, 98-102, in the record at 506. The Appellant
allegedly attempted to get his cousin to drive the second vehicle for him. Id. She
refused. Both testified that the Appellant did not point the gun at them and the cousin
who was the closest, about five feet from Appellant stated she was not afraid of
Appellant. Id at pages 77, 87, and 107; see also excerpts from trial transcripts at Exhibit
C, Addendum attached. She then fled to where her children and boyfriend were hiding.
Id. The Appellant allegedly unhooked the vehicle and fled in it without permission. Id.
The vehicle was retrieved later that night some distance away. See trial transcript,
volume 2 at page 140, in the record at 506.
3. The Appellant was seen walking along Old Highway 91 along 1-15 north
between Cedar City and Enoch, Utah, about four o'clock in the morning. See trial
transcript, volume 2, at page 140, in the record at 506. He was arrested by officer Matt
Topham. Detective Tim Bonzo of the Cedar City Police Department also was present.
Officer Topham asked the Appellant where his shotgun was concerned for safety since
the Appellant didn't have it with him. See hearing transcript, Motion to Suppress at
pages 13-15, in the record at 503. Appellant said he hid it in the mountains. Id. He was
taken to the police station. Officer Mike Bleak questioned him. Id. He gave him a
blanket and some hot chocolate. Id at pages 19-26. During the initial part of the
interview, the Appellant made a statement, "Is he all right?". Id at 21. This was before
he was advised of his right to remain silent. Id. He also indicated that he had heard
9

voices that had told him to murder. Id at 22. When advised of his rights, the Appellant
was ambiguous in his response as to whether he understood them but the interview
continued. Id at 29-31.
4. A preliminary hearing was held on the 3rd day of April, 2007 and the Appellant
was bound over on the original charges. See the record at 111-112. He pled not guilty.
Id at 120-121. A motion to suppress was filed in November of that year and an
evidentiary hearing was held on or about the 14th day of January, 2008. Id at 171, 198
and 265. Counsel moved to suppress statements made by Appellant at the time of
arrest and during interrogation and for items removed from Appellant's residence
through the warrantless search. Id. At the evidentiary hearing, the officers testified that
the Appellant's father consented to searching the residence. See hearing transcript,
Motion to Suppress at pages 44-45, in the record at 503. However, the Appellant's
father testified that he understood the search was simply to try and locate the Appellant
and that when he discovered they were searching for personal property he asked them
to leave and get a warrant. Id at pages 52-55.
5. The trial court judge denied Appellant's motion to suppress as to post-Miranda
statements and regarding items retrieved from the search of Appellant's bedroom. See
the record at 265.
6. Thereafter, notice was filed to claim diminished mental capacity and the
Appellant was ordered to undergo an evaluation. Id at 295. The appointed alienists
found the Appellant competent to stand trial but noted issues of metal disorder
including hallucinations and delusions complicated by the use of alcohol. See the
record at 224-28, 235-41, 311-15 and 319-29. Dr. Kockler found alcohol induced
psychotic disorder with hallucinations with onset during intoxication. Dr. Wootton found
10

Appellant likely to meet the standard for guilty and mentally ill. Id. Parties stipulated to
allowing as a consideration not guilty by reason of insanity as part of the general verdict
form. A special verdict form was used to take into consideration the alternative of guilty
and mentally ill. Id at 424 and 427. The trial court judge did not allow Appellant's
requested instruction for special mitigation. See trial transcript, volume 4, at pages 3-5,
in the record at 505.
7. The Appellant did not testify at trial. Instruction No. 10 concerning attempted
aggravated murder addressed the victim by name but was not objected to by
Appellant's counsel. Id. See the record at 406. Other instructions given did not identify
the victims by name. See the record at 407-410; see elements instructions at Exhibit D,
Addendum attached.
8. After three days, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to both counts of the
amended information. It made a finding on the special verdict form of guilty and not
mentally ill. See the record at 424 and 427; see also verdict and special verdict retruns
at Exhibit E, Addendum attached.
9. Just prior to sentencing, the Appellant submitted a letter which was ambiguous
as to asserting an appeal or requesting a new trial and later withdrew his request for
new trial to go forward on appeal. Id at 472. The Appellant did assert grievances which
are viewed by this attorney as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. This case
was assigned to the Court of Appeals in May, 2009. Id at 499.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.
The jury was not adequately instructed on the burden of proof and the Court
refused to given an instruction on special mitigation, finding that the evidence was not
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sufficient to allow such instruction. In fact, the instruction was disallowed because the
use of alcohol was involved. However, Appellant contends that it was for the jury to
decide and that the instruction should have been given. Moreover, the elements
instruction No. 10, concerning attempt of aggravated murder should not have identified
the victim, JASON THOMAS, by name which played upon the sympathies and passions
of the jury. This was the only instruction that identified its victim so precisely and there
was no reason to be so specific. However, defense counsel did not object and therefore
consideration is limited to plan error review. The Appellant asserts that one cannot
assume the jury would have convicted notwithstanding the mistake because the various
instructions apply to lesser offenses that did not have the same specificity. That
Appellant was convicted and not acquitted or found guilty for a lesser charge
establishes harm.
B.
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, which the Court
reviews for correctness, giving no defense to the decision of the trial court. The trial
court did not consider the totality of the circumstances correctly, finding the Appellant
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent when there was no clear
response or statement made by Appellant to support that position. Instead, the trial
court looked to the inconsistent action and statements made by Appellant during
interrogation and concluded this to be convincing to establish that the Appellant waived
his right. The trial court should have considered the circumstances incident to the
interrogation, the Appellant's physical and emotional condition, the immediacy of the
interrogation after arrest and the need for it. The interrogating officer staged the
interrogation to come off friendly and trusting and then used that relationship of trust to
12

manipulate the Appellant. In context, the ploy did not support the pre-Miranda
admission and it should have been suppressed.
The trial court also erred in condoning the warantless search of the Appellant's
bedroom as consensual. It was wrong to consider in the context of credibility of
witnesses. To allow the matter to be resolved upon law enforcement's self serving
testimony verse that of the party upon whom law enforcement may be intruding without
authority is a receipt for disaster in establishing precedent. In this case, the officer's had
no probable cause or extenuating reason or justification to continue searching after they
established the fact that Appellant was not there and after Appellant's father told them
to leave and get a warrant. To get a warrant would not have been an undue hardship on
law enforcement.
C.
There was insufficient evidence to convict the Appellant of aggravated robbery.
The charge does not fit the circumstances. The officer was not shot nor the shotgun
used in the commission of a robbery. Aggravated robbery requires that there be a
robbery or an attempt to commit robbery. The motor vehicle was taken later and the
record does not support reasonable reference that although Appellant still had the
shotgun that he used it to take the vehicle. The taking of the vehicle is an aggravating
circumstance to robbery. It cannot be robbery and the aggravating circumstance without
another aggravating circumstance. The law does not support prior acts to the
commission of the robbery and the record does not support a subsequent aggravating
act. However, defense counsel did not move for directed verdict and therefore it can
only be considered by this Court under the plan error exception. To the extent that this
Court will consider the matter counsel of Appellant has attempted to marshal the
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evidence accordingly.
D.
Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The standard has
long been established. It is proven when performance is deficient as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness and except for such deficient performance there
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. In
this case, defense counsel was deficient due to certain oversights which included
scrutinizing the jury instructions more closely, not allowing instruction No. 10 to name
Jason Thomas specifically, making sure the burden of proof was articulated in the
instruction on mental illness and pressing for exception to the trial court's refusal to give
a special mitigation instruction. Next, the testimony of the alienists needed to be
developed more completely to show Appellant's mental disorder with delusion and
triggers for onset. Last, counsel should have moved for directed verdict at least as to
the charge of aggravated robbery or object to the extent that the Court would have a
chance to consider the elements of the charge after having heard the evidence
presented.
ARGUMENTS
A.
THE JURY WAS NOT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED ON THE BURDEN OF PROOF
AND SPECIAL MITIGATION FOR DIMINISHED CAPACITY AND THE JURY
INSTRUCTION ON ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER WAS IMPROPER.
The trial court attempted to instruct the jury pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 77-16a-102 (1953, as amended). At sub-section (2)(a) in pertinent part it reads:
When a defendant asserts the mental defense pursuant to Section 76-3-305 or
asserts special mitigation reducing the level of the offense pursuant to subsection 76-5-205.5 (1)(a), or when the evidence raises the issue and either party
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requests the instruction, the jury shall be instructed that if it finds a defendant
guilty of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any charge, offense or lesser
included offense, it shall also return a special verdict indicating whether it finds
the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense. The jury was instructed
accordingly in Instruction Number18, see the record at 415.
While the jury instruction in this case appears to meet the statutory
requirements, it fails to inform the jury as to the State having the burden of proof. The
instruction does not designate that the State must establish by a preponderance of
evidence that the Defendant was not mentally ill.
This Court in State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, has under similar circumstances
reversed and remanded for new trial when the trial court failed to give an adequate
burden of proof instruction where an affirmative defense was asserted and found that
the plain error doctrine applied. As in this case defense counsel did not object. The
error, however, is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial
court, see State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App 1997). However, the
circumstances of Garcia closely parallel those of the instant case regarding procedural
rules. That is, "the State must prove a criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt," State v.
Knoll 712 P.2d 211 (Utah, 1985). Such burden remains on the State, whether
defendant offers any evidence in an effort to prove affirmative defenses or not. State v.
Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980).
Not informing the jury of the burden of such proof made the instruction
ambiguous and in light of the fact that there was confusion as to how the evidence was
presented, the State initially calling the doctors involved as part of its case in chief, the
jury was left to speculate upon whose burden it was to establish such proof.
The Court attempted to rectify this by allowing counsel for the Appellant to
proceed with questioning on direct examination. This only made speculation by the jury
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more confusing. This is because the jury was neither advised nor properly instructed on
this critical point. This was discussed outside the presence of the jury by counsel and
the court, see trial transcript volume 3 at pages 31 to 54 in the record at 504. It resulted
in a change of the questioning procedure with defense counsel now questioning Dr.
Wootton on direct examination. While the Court did advise the jury that it was not the
obligation of the Appellant to present evidence, Id at page 54, this explanation was
insufficient to clarify the burden of proof.
There was a general instruction, number 8, see the record at 404, given to the
jury before evidence was presented on the first day of trial. This instruction informed the
jury that the State had the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. It does not mention preponderance of evidence which is the standard required
for proving that the Appellant was not mentally ill. As this Court asserted in Garcia,
paragraph 12, the jury may acquit even though the evidence of the defense falls short
of establishing justification or excuse by a preponderance of the evidence upon the
subject, quoting State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 181, 120 P. 497, 502 (1911). However, in
this case the uncertainty of whose burden it was to prove mental illness or the lack
thereof was left unresolved.
The testimony of both doctors went uncontroverted to the point of mental illness
and each commented upon the impact of voluntary intoxication. The instructions
addressed adequately the matter of intoxication but were inadequate in advising the
jury of it being the State's burden to prove no mental illness. Moreover, this question is
not clarified in the special jury verdict form in the record at 427. It is noted that neither
the general verdict form nor the special verdict form were signed by concurring jurors,
see the record at 426 and 428; see also Exhibit E, Addendum attached. The trial court
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asked if the verdict was unanimous and the foreperson responded that it was. See the
trial transcript at volume 4 page 45 in the record at 505. However, defense counsel did
not ask for the jury to be polled or examine the returned verdicts. Id at 46.
Like in Garcia, the circumstances are the same where defense counsel did not
object to the form of the jury instructions given. Therefore, review is limited. It must
demonstrate plain error. To do so, the Appellant must show an error occurred that
should have been obvious to the trial court and that prejudiced the outcome of his trial.
Id at paragraph 17; see also State v. Litherland, 200 UT 76, paragraph 31, 12 p.3d 92.
This Court has found obvious error in failing to instruct the jury about the burden of
proof for self-defense in that case, and should find the same concerning the
circumstances in this case. It also found such error harmful and like in Garcia which
corroborates defendant's actions, in this case the testimony of the two court appointed
alienists confirmed mental illness whose testimony went uncontroverted.
Instruction No. 10 was improper in that it named JASON THOMAS specifically in
the elements portion of the instruction. In light of the circumstances, this allowed the
jury to be influenced by sympathy, passion or factors in close connection with the victim
even though it was instructed to not be influenced by such in Instruction No. 2, in the
record at 398. It was not necessary to identify the victim by name to properly instruct
the jury any more for aggravated murder than it was necessary to identify the victims by
name in instruction numbers 11, 12, 13 or 14 where specific names were properly
excluded. Notwithstanding the fact that the Appellant was found guilty of Count 2
pursuant to a properly worded instruction, it cannot be presumed that the same verdict
would have resulted in Count 1 if it had not specifically named Jason Thomas. In this
case, careful instruction was warranted in light of the number of alternatives the jury
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was obliged to consider as lesser offenses.
There is also to consider the trial court's ruling about the instruction on special
mitigation requested by counsel for Appellant. Objection was made and the trial court
ruled there were insufficient facts presented to justify instructing the jury with regard to
that issue. See trial transcript, volume 4 at page 4 in the record at 505. This was
inconsistent with the trial court's previous statement that it's not the obligation of the
defendant to present any evidence. See trial transcript, volume 3, at page 54 in the
record at 504. Moreover, the special mitigation instruction was appropriate to offer in
light of the evidence presented by both alienists who found Appellant suffered from
delusion among other forms of mental illness. While the trial court judge indicated that
the proposed instruction was attached to the record, this attorney was unable to find it
but must assume from the dialogue that it was patterned after Utah Code Annotated,
Section 76-5-205.5 (1953, as amended).
A similar situation was addressed in State v. Marshall, 2005 UT App 269. In that
case, this Court reasserted the position of the Utah Supreme Court that, "while a party
who fails to object to or give an instruction may have an instruction assigned as error
under the manifest injustice exception, a party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error". Id at
paragraph 5. It went on to state that a jury instruction may not be assigned as error
even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice if counsel, either by statement or
act, affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no objection to the jury
instruction. Unlike Marshall, where it is noted that both parties actively represented to
the trial court in chambers that the instructions were acceptable, in this case the trial
court asked if there were objections just prior to considering defense counsel's jury
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instruction on special mitigation. See the trial transcript, volume 4 at page 3. This is not
the same as actually representing his acceptance.
In light of the inadequacy of properly identifying the burden of proof or for special
mitigation and instructing the jury of the elements in Count 1 by identifying the victim by
name, jury instructions in this case were in error and Appellant asserts that the same
caused his conviction or from inadequate consideration on the issue of mental illness
an adequate opportunity to have consider lesser offenses and should therefore be
remanded for new trial or the jury verdicts reversed.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Prior to trial, a motion to suppress was brought. This Court in State v. Carter,
2006 UT App 460 considered a similar motion but concerning a different charge. It
stated that "the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court. Id at paragraph 6.
See also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT22, at paragraph 17, 70 P.3d 111. It also stated
"as a general rule, it will not consider an issue, including a constitutional argument,
raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case
involved exceptional circumstances, quoting State v. Brower, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah
App 1993).
In this case, an evidentiary hearing was held and points and authorities were
submitted. Items of personal property were collected by law enforcement and
statements made by Appellant were later used at trial. The trial court in its decision
notes the standard but does not apply it correctly. This is particularly disconcerting to
the extent as it pertains to warantless search.
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In State v. Strain 779 P.2d 221,#224 (Utah 1989) the Utah Supreme Court noted
that waiver of one's right to remain silent must be executed with full awareness of the
nature of the right being abandoned and of the consequences of the decision to
abandon it. See also Miran v. Burbine 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). A waiver of miranda
rights must be voluntary, see Strain at 224 (quoting Miran, at 421). The trial court saw
no issue as to whether the post-Miranda statements were voluntary in this case but it
does not adequately address the concern for deception. In a footnote the trial court
judge points out that he is troubled by the way the officer enticed the Appellant, telling
him that honestly wouldn't hurt him since this contradicted the Miranda warning that
anything Appellant said could be used against him in court. See the record at 283; see
also Exhibit B, Addendum attached. The judge, however, noted that notwithstanding the
officer's interrogation tactics he was still persuaded based on the remaining
circumstances that the Appellant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. The Appellant
disagrees.
In State v. Barnett, 2006 UT App 417, this Court addressed suppression for both
post-Miranda and pre-Miranda statements much in the same way the trial court did in
the present case. In reviewing situations where absent any coercion during the first
unwarned admission, a defendant's subsequent statements are admissible if they were
voluntarily made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. Id at
paragraph 8. However, unlike that case there was no clear waiver because of the
equivocal responses made by Appellant. Also, since it was the pre-Miranda statement
of the Appellant, "Is he alright?" that was introduced at trial and no similar post-Miranda
admissions, this one is difficult to characterize as harmless error like this Court found in
Barnett. See Barnett at paragraph 16. Compare trial transcript, volume 2, at pages 15520

61, in the record at 506.
The officer did not respond to the Appellant's attempt to obtain more information
before proceeding. The Appellant had a right to know what consequences he would be
facing. Instead, the officer used each instance under the pretext of honesty and
favorable treatment if he cooperated to get the Appellant to confess. The tactics
employed by the officer were subtle but effective given Appellant's condition and the
circumstances. The officer provided him with a blanket and hot chocolate after he had
been wet, cold and disoriented from the weather, the circumstances and the arrest. The
officer noticed that his teeth were chattering when the interrogation began. These
gestures of caring for the Appellant would not have been inappropriate had he not used
them as an interrogation ploy. However, showing concern was pretextual and that is
evident by the immediacy of the interrogation, particularly in light of the fact that it
occurred in the early morning hours of the following day. Id. However, the trial court
judge failed to consider these factors in proper context. Instead, he reached his
conclusions from the inconsistent action and statements made by the Appellant during
the interrogation which only made more evident the confusion the Appellant manifested.
Had the trial court placed the statements in context with timing and circumstance, it
would have likely concluded that such waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently.
As to the alleged search without warrant but by consent of the Appellant's
bedroom, testimony runs contrary and inconsistent. The trial court judge chose to
believe the testimony of law enforcement when the owner of the premises, the father of
the Appellant, testified that he did not fully understand everything that was asked.
When he asked the officers to get a warrant they continued to search. There is no
probable cause or exigent circumstance. This Court in State v. Duran, 2005 UT App
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409 set forth what is expected in circumstances concerning warantless searches. Like
in that case, a family member with common authority allegedly consented. Concerning
such authority it stated:
Finding common authority of the property by persons generally having join access or
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the
cohabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others
have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched. Id at paragraph 11.
This requires a shared use that simply did not exist in the instant case.
Appellant's personal property was not property with other having joint access in his
bedroom any more than that which was found not in Duran. Moreover, there is even a
less persuasive reason for asserting that the officers reasonably relied upon this
apparent authority. There was no reason for law enforcement to be there except to
determine if the Appellant was there. Once that determination was made that he was
not, law enforcement inappropriately used entry as reason to stay when asked to leave.
As stated by this Court in State v. Vallasenor, 2005 UT App 65, it depends upon the
circumstances as then existed at the time the search is made and for exigent
circumstances it is an objective determination. The guiding principle in reasonableness,
examined in light of the facts known to the officers at the time they acted. Id at
paragraph 10 and 15. In this case, they misled the Appellant's father into believing they
were only searching for him. The trial court judge frankly adopted the course of familiar
trappings of believing the word of law enforcement over the one having this
fundamental and constitutional right against such unauthorized intrusion. This misses
the point. That way of ruling upon evidence and weighing it as though it were deferential
to a fact finder's discretion each time contrary to the interests of such fundamental
protection disregards the protected rights of all property owners and gives law
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enforcement an unfettered hand in perpetuating questionable search and seizure
practices. It is a scenario repeated too often to allow it to go unchecked. Whatever the
circumstances, the officer will always feel that such steps or action are necessary to
their urgent investigation. Granted, the circumstances in this case are serious in their
nature. However, that should not compromise what has long been established as
protected interests against unauthorized intrusion especially where as in this case it
would not have been a hardship upon law enforcement to simply secure a warrant.
Consequently, the Appellant asserts that the trial court judge erred in denying his
motion to suppress such evidence and testimony.
C.
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT APPELLANT ON AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY
The charge of aggravated robbery is set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section
76-6-302 (1953, as amended). Upon first impression it seems to apply to the
circumstances. However, in closer review the evidence in the case falls short simply
because it does not apply. Each subsection seems to have some application in
examining the circumstances. Subsection (1) reads as follows:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
In the present case, the evidence supports use of a dangerous weapon as a
loaded shotgun would certainly qualify. It also supports the finding of causing serious
bodily injury upon another. Close range shots to the chest, neck, head and shoulders
are well established. Moreover, the evidence supports the finding that an operable
motor vehicle was taken. What is not supported in the evidence is the primary element
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of the charge, "committing robbery". The Appellant was not in the course of committing
robbery when the officer approached. A robbery was not in progress when the officer
responded. Subsection (2) makes aggravated robbery a first degree felony because
robbery is a second degree felony. It becomes aggravated by doing one of the three
aggravating qualifications in the course of committing robbery. In other words, there
must be a robbery before considering the aggravating circumstances. That simply did
not happen in this case from the evidence presented. This brings the matter to subparagraph 3 which states:
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
Again, the circumstances fall short in applying this primary element which is
attempt, commission or flight from the commission of a robbery. Even though in this
case, the evidence supports each and every alternative for aggravation, including the
taking of an operable motor vehicle, the taking of the vehicle is not what is
contemplated under the statute as the robbery. While the Appellant allegedly still had
the gun while taking the vehicle of those assisting the record does not establish that the
gun was used against them to take it. The only inference that can be drawn to support
the jury's verdict is to conclude that taking a vehicle was what constituted the robbery
and it was aggravated by threatening to use a dangerous weapon or causing serious
bodily injury to the officer. However, these events transpired prior to attempting to
commit, during the commission or after the attempt or commission of the taking of the

1. The two who testified at trial, CHRISTINE TALLMAN and PEDRO HINOJOSA, stated that Appellant
never pointed the gun at them. Ms. Tallman, who is Appellant's cousin, was about five feet away when
Appellant ordered her to drive. She ran instead. That makes for a difficult inference to draw from the
evidence since it is unlikely she would have responded that way had he turned the shotgun upon her.
Since this is such a critical point of consideration, counsel has included excerpts from both witnesses at
Exhibit C, Addendum attached.
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vehicle. This tortures the language to include prior acts as part of the course of
committing robbery which makes such inference an unreasonable one to consider.
Remanding the matter for retrial will not likely change the facts or circumstances
regarding this charge. The sequence of events are not likely to change with a new trial
and sufficient evidence was established to call into question any subsequent
inconsistent sequence. To the contrary the appropriate resolution seems to be for
directed verdict although in this case counsel for Appellant did not make that motion. To
the extent that the issue was not one reserved for appeal, Appellant contends that the
same is one of plain error and the facts and circumstances are sufficiently marshalled
to consider as an insufficiency of evidence claim.
D.
APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL
Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of three exceptions to the preservation
rule considered by this Court. See State v. Hansen, 2001 UT App 14, paragraph 3; see
also State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App 1996). However, to successfully claim
ineffective assistance, Appellant must:
(i) identify specify acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard of
reasonable professional assistance, and
(ii) demonstrate that counsel's error prejudiced Appellant. See State v. Parker,
2000 UT 51, paragraph 10, 4 P.3d 778.
In Hansen, this Court found the defendant's trial counsel was deficient failing to
request a jury instruction on two statutory defenses. Hansen, 2001 UT App 14 at
paragraph 8. However, due to its finding that there was no reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome, a fact sensitive conclusion, it found harmless error. The
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circumstances in the present case are distinguishable for the reasons asserted above.
One can always find points of criticism in reviewing the trial work of another
attorney. The standard for review requires that there be more than simply making a
mistake. It contemplates a performance that is so deficient as to fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness. It must offer reasonable probability that the outcome of the
trial would have been different. Appellant was deprived of this right when his attorney's
conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the
proceedings could not be relied on to produce a just result. In the instant case, this
occurred by a series of oversights. First, counsel should have scrutinized the proposed
jury instructions more closely. While Appellant asserts that the errors committed in
faulty instructions fall into a category of plain error, counsel's failure to address to some
extent invited error as is often the case by such oversight. Therefore, it will likely not be
reversed or remanded unless this Court finds such oversight error as coming within the
manifest injustice exception. See State v. Marshall, 2005 UT App 269 at paragraph 5.
See also State v. Geukqeuzian, 2004 UT 16, paragraph 19, 86 P.3d 742.
Second, more evidence could have been developed from the testimony of the
doctors regarding Appellant's delusional state. Each doctor commented through
testimony and through assessment that Appellant's mental illness included delusions,
one diagnosing it to be an alcohol-induced psychotic disorder with hallucinations and
the other alcohol-induced psychotic disorder with delusions and a schizoaffective
disorder of the depressed type.
Third, counsel for Appellant should have moved for directed verdict regarding
Count 2, aggravated robbery. As mentioned, these are oversights and therefore difficult
to explain away as a calculated strategy. In fact, there is no strategy that would warrant
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not objecting under the circumstances. However, it was due to these oversights that
rendered such performance as ineffective and it is probable that had they not been
made the outcome of the trial would have been different.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests that
the matter be remanded with instructions or reversed the verdict of the jury together
with such other and further relief as to this Co*frt appears equitable and proper.

DATED this /Z&V
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^

J. BRYAW7JACKSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Exhibit A

MW 17 2009

SCOTT F. GARRETT (#8687)
Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite 201
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435)865-^310

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

JUDGMENT, FINDINGS, SENTENCE,
AND COMMITMENT

;

vs.

]

BRYAN FEATHERHAT,

;>

Criminal No. 071500011

Defendant.

]I

Judge G. Michael Westfall

The Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, having been convicted on November 20, 2008,
pursuant to a jury trial and verdicts of guilty, of the offenses of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED
MURDER, a First-Degree Felony, and AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First-Degree Felony, and the
Court having entered said verdicts of guilty and having ordered the preparation of a presentence
investigation report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled
matter having come on for sentencing on January 20, 2009, and the Defendant, BRYAN
FEATHERHAT, having appeared before the Court in person, together with his attorney of record
Jack B. Burns, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott F.
Garrett, and the Court having reviewed the presentence investigation report and the file in detail, and

having further heard statements from all parties and being fully advised in the premises, now makes
and enters the following Judgment, Findings, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, pursuant to his guilty plea,
the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, has been convicted of the offenses of ATTEMPTED
AGGRAVATED MURDER, a First-Degree Felony, and AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a FirstDegree Felony; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to
why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or
appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
FINDINGS
In determining whether to run the Defendant's convictions consecutively or concurrently, the
Court made the following findings, to wit:
1.

The Court found that the gravity of the offense of Attempted Aggravated Murder, a

First-Degree Felony, was sufficient to justify consecutive sentences. The Court indicated that it
could not think of more grave conduct than firing a shotgun at point-blank range and then continuing
to shoot at the officer as he attempted to flee. Moreover, the Court found that, but for the bulletproof vest which Officer Thomas was wearing at the time of the incident, Officer Thomas would
have died from the gunshot wounds.
2.

Additionally, the Court found that the offenses involved multiple victims and that

each of the counts involved totally separate victims. Therefore, the Court determined that this factor
also supported the order of consecutive sentences.
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3.

Further, the Court considered the Defendant's rehabilitative needs and determined

that the Defendant needs rehabilitation; that the Defendant acknowledged he needs rehabilitation;
that his history bears that out; and the Defendant's family also acknowledged that the Defendant
needs rehabilitation.
4.

The Court found that the Utah State Prison is the appropriate place for the Defendant

to obtain his treatment and that this case is an appropriate case for consecutive sentences.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant, BRYAN
FEATHERHAT, and pursuant to his conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER, a
First-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment in the Utah State
Prison for a period of not less than five (5) years and which may be for life, and the Defendant is
hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State Department of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, and pursuant
to his conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER, a First-Degree Felony, shall pay
a fine in the sum and amount often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%)
surcharge, and a court security fee in the sum and amount of twenty-five dollars ($25).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, and pursuant
to his conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period of not less than five (5)
years and which may be for life, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State
Department of Corrections.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, and pursuant
to his conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First-Degree Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum
and amount often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge, and a
court security fee in the sum and amount of twenty-five dollars ($25).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, shall pay
restitution in the amount of twenty-four thousand two hundred forty-one dollars and sixty cents
($24,241.60) (specifically, as follows: the amount of $22,156.50 to TPA for Utah Local
Governments Trust; the amount of $1,628.10 to the Cedar City Police Depanment; and the amount
of $457.00 to Workers Compensation Fund).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentences set forth herein shall be served
consecutively.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, and
deliver him to the Utah State Department of Corrections in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and
confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Findings, Sentence, and
Commitment.
DATED this

^,A
(7

f

/__

day of F^bnlary, 2009.
BY THE C Q U p

' G./K4JCHAEL WESTFALL
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN SMITHERMAN, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original
Judgment, Findings, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Bryan
Featherhat Criminal No, 071500011, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,
this

/ /

day of F^te&ary, 2009.
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CAROLYN SMITHERMAN
District Clerk* of Court
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By:
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AJVWV
District Deputy Clerk of Court

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a full, true, and correct copy of the within and
foregoing JUDGMENT, FINDINGS, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, on this

//

•

day

of February, 2009, to Jack B. Burns, Attorney for Defendant, at the office of the Iron County
Attorney, 82 North 100 East, Suite 201, Cedar City, Utah.

<7JwAssistant
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Exhibit B

FILED
JUL 3 0 2008
bin uiolHiOl C O U R T / ,
IRON COUNTY
(fjf^
OEPUTY CLERK

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART

Plaintiff,

AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
Case No. 071500011
BRYAN FEATHERHAT,
Judge G. Michael Westfall
Defendant.

On November 5, 2007, Defendant Bryan Featherhat moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during a search of his residence and the statements he made to police and/or other state
agents. On January 14, 2008, an evidentiary hearing was held on the Motion to Suppress. On
March 24, 2008, Defendant filed a memorandum in support of the Motion. On April 2, 2008, the
State filed a memorandum responding to the Motion. On April 10, 2008, Defendant filed a reply
memorandum in support of the Motion. On May 27, 2008, at a review hearing, counsel verbally
requested that the Motion be submitted for decision. As explained below, the Motion is granted
in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Based on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on the Motion, the Court finds
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the following facts:1
A. Defendant's Initial Statements to Law Enforcement
On January 5, 2007, the Cedar City Police Department received a report that one of their
officers had been shot with a 12-gauge shotgun. Based on the report, local law enforcement
began searching for Defendant as a suspect.
On January 6, 2007, at about 4:00 a.m., Cedar City police officers Matthew Topham and
Tim Bonzo located Defendant on Old Highway 91 in Iron County.
Officer Topham encountered Defendant first, and shined his spotlight at him. Defendant
immediately raised his hands in the air.
Asked what his name was, Defendant responded, "Bryan," at which time the officer
pointed his .40 caliber service pistol at him. Defendant confirmed that his name was Bryan
Featherhat, turned around, and complied with the officer's instruction to lie down.
About this time, Detective Bonzo arrived, and instantly trained his shotgun on Defendant.
Without administering Miranda warnings, and while the officers still had their weapons
aimed at Defendant, Officer Topham asked Defendant where his (Defendant's) shotgun was.
This question was motivated, at least in part, by Officer Topham's concern for his own and
Detective Bonzo's safety.

1

For convenience, some of the facts included below are taken verbatim, or with only
slight modifications, from the fact statements respectively presented by the parties.
2
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Defendant responded that it was up in the mountains.
B. Defendant's Interrogation
Within about an hour of his arrest. Defendant was transported to an interrogation room at
the Cedar City Police Department.2 The interrogating officer, Detective Mike Bleak, began by
taking an active interest in making Defendant comfortable. He inquired whether Defendant,
whose clothes had been frozen and covered with snow at the time of his arrest, was warming up.
(4:48:25-4:48:30).3 At Defendant's request, Detective Bleak brought him some water and
adjusted Defendant's handcuffs. Additionally, Detective Bleak gave Defendant some hot
chocolate and put a blanket over his shoulders. (4:48:50-4:54:55).
Next, Detective Bleak requested that Defendant give him certain identifying and contact
information, including his name, address, phone number, date of birth, and social security
number. Defendant gave_ all of the requested information, and Detective Bleak wrote, it down,
within less than two minutes. (4:55:19-4:56:36).
Then the following conversation occurred:
Detective Bleak: Alright, well Bryan, I'm sure you know why you're here

2

Officer Topham testified, and the Court finds, that Defendant was arrested at about 4:00
a.m. The time shown at the beginning of the video of the interrogation is about 4:48. Detective
Bleak testified, and the Court finds, that the time shown on the video is accurate.
3

All of the time references included here are taken from the time shown on the video of
the interrogation.
3
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tonight. And let me just start out by telling you this, alright? I know that—that
there's two sides to every story, and I know that every—
Defendant: Is he alright?4
Detective Bleak: What's that?
Defendant: Is he alright?
Detective Bleak: Yeah, yeah, he is—he's going to be alright. But I know—I
mean, there's two sides to every story. And, it's just important for us to, uh, just
get to the bottom of it—figure out why, you know, try and understand what led
you to this, and I guess the thing that we're probably most concerned of, Bryan, is
that when you get—somebody gets to this point, obviously you need some kind of
help with something, and you know that—it's unfortunate that it has to go to these
extremes to try and get you some help, but you knowjthat's kind of the point
we're at now—that's something we might be able to offer you. Um, and as we
talk, I—I don't expect, I don't want you to make anything up, but, all I—all I
want's the truth. The truth is something that's—that's really going to help you out

4

Detective Bleak testified, and the Court finds, that he understood the "he" in
Defendant's question to refer to Officer Jason Thomas, the Cedar City police officer allegedly
shot by Defendant the night before the interrogation. That Defendant's question was intended to
refer to Officer Thomas is also evident later in the interrogation, when Detective Bleak discusses
this question with Defendant, and expressly states that Defendant was referring to Officer
Thomas, which Defendant does not deny. (5:28:45-5:32:27).
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in the long run. And I'm—Fm not blowing smoke up you're a**, I'm here to be
straight with you,'and as long as—you're straight with me, Fm straight with you,
*kay? Uh, as we're talking (clears throat), and bef—and before I ask you any
questions, I just wanna make sure that you understand what your rights are, okay?
Uh, first of all, you have the right to remain silent. And anything you say can and
will be used in court against you. You have the right to an attorney and have him
present during any questioning. And if you can't afford an attorney, one can be
provided to you by the court. Do you understand those rights okay, Bryan?
Defendant: Yeah.
Detective Bleak: Okay, with those rights in mind, do you want to tell me your
side of the story?
Defendant: Well, it's just like, I don't know, I've just been hearing a lot of stuff,
you know?5
Detective Bleak: What kind of stuff?
Defendant: Like, to the breaking point where I either commit suicide or—it's
like, everything, like everything is talking to me, like God's talking to me and, it's
like (inaudible) over the radio and stuff and I don't know if it's me putting the

3

Defendant incorrectly states that he said, "Well, I don't know, we did a lot of stuff you
know." Mem. in Supp. at 3.
5
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heads in my own thought or whatever and stuff, and just like, I don't know, it just
told me to murder. I don't know if it was the music telling me to do it or what.
(4-56-40-4:59:05).
A little over a half-hour later in the interview, after Defendant had said, among other
things, that he could not remember a lot of what had happened the night before, the conversation
continued as follows:
Detective Bleak: Was [the gun] laying on the seat?
Defendant: Will this help me in court?6
Detective Bleak: It'll—itDefendant: Or will it help you guys?
Detective Bleak: Dude, I'll be honest with you. Honesty goes a long way for
everyone involved. I'll tell you that straight up. Honesty goes a long way-with
the prosecutor, with the judge-nobody wants to go into court and listen to some
b.s., dude, ah, ah, and that's the truth. Honesty goes a long way-with me,
with-with the judge, with the prosecutor. I mean, I—I'll be honest with you. I
mean it's-we've got all the evidence in the world of what happened. The-the
thing that we're missing, the thing that-that we're just trying to understand is-is

6

Defendant incorrectly states that his question was, "Will they send me to court?" Mem.
in Supp. at 3.
6
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what was going on. What-I mean everybody's got-there's two sides to every
story, there's-there's two versions to every story, and we've got all sorts of pieces
here (Clears throat.) The only things we're missing is your version. This is your
opportunity to tell us what's going on-tell us what you were thinking. I mean
this—this is your one opportunity Bryan. This is-this is-this is the only time you
and I are going to talk, 'kay? And this is the opportunity, you know, for me to go
to the prosecutor and say, "Hey, Bryan jerked me around" or (inaudible) "Bryan
was straight up honest, and let's get this guy some help," and that's no bullsh**,
that's straight up. At this point, you're gonna do nothing but help yourself in the
long run, man. And that's-that's honest. I—I—I just want to know what happened.
I want to understand, Bryan-you wanna-what happened there tonight. And I
know that you know. I know you can remember-'cuz that's-I mean that's a pretty
traumatic thing-I-I know that you can remember. Bryan, start-start with me from
when you reached in the truck and got the gun and just tell me what happened.
Defendant: (Coughs.) Is this like a confession or . . . ?
Detective Bleak: This is just me trying to understand.
Defendant: You might think I'm crazy and stuff, but-you know, I wouldn't-I,
you know, I just told you it was the music and stuff, and it was like-you know, it
told me-it told me to shoot him and stuff.
7
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(5 36 20-5 40 20)
In the course of the interview, Defendant failed to answer a number of Detective Bleak s
questions choosing instead to remain silent
Toward the end of the interview, Defendant was reminded again that his statement would
be forwarded to the prosecutor

Detective Bleak stated

Well, at this point, we put a case togethei last night a little bit and the Judge has already
seen the initial report and the Judge issued a warrant foi your arrest So that's

you re

gonna be arrested on a warrant and booked into jail Like I said I told you earlier,
honesty goes a long way with us That's something that's definitely gonna get passed on
to the prosecutor He'll deal with it from here on out Alright9
(6 23 27-6 23 58)
Defendant did not respond to that statement or the invitation to comment
C. Search of Defendant's Bedroom
On the evening of January 5, 2007, shortly after the shooting, Detective Dustm Orton and
other Cedar City police officers visited the home of Defendant's parents, where Defendant was
then residing Defendant's father, Harlan Featherhat, met Detective Orton at the front door and,
in response to the detective's inquiry, stated that Defendant was not there Detective Orton
informed Harlan that the officers weie looking for Defendant in connection with a shooting
incident, and asked whether the police could come in and search for him and other items Harlan
8
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consented, telling Detective Orton that the police could look for anything they needed.7
Defendant's mother was present during this exchange, and at no time manifested any opposition
to Detective Orton's request to search.
Accordingly, the officers went through the home and confirmed that Defendant was not
there. In the process of looking for Defendant, Detective Orton recovered some items that were
in plain view in Defendant's bedroom. Detective Orton's search did not extend beyond anything
in plain view.
Soon after the police had searched the home for Defendant, Detective Bonzo arrived.
Informed by Detective Orton that Defendant's parents had verbally consented to a search of the
home, Detective Bonzo proceeded to conduct a thorough search of Defendant's bedroom, and
recovered a number of items from desk drawers and the closet area. Detective Bonzo spoke with
Harlan, at least once during the search, and again before leaving, showing Harlan the items
recovered from Defendant's bedroom. At no time did Harlan manifest any opposition to the
officers' presence or to the search, and he affirmatively approved of them taking the items they
had found.8
7

The testimony on this point was conflicting. Detective Orton testified that he asked for,
and was given, consent to search the home for Defendant and other items. Harlan testified that
the detective only requested, and that he only gave, consent to search for Defendant. The Court
finds the detective's testimony here more credible than that of Harlan.
8

Again, the testimony here was conflicting. The testimony from Detective Orton and
Detective Bonzo supports the above statement of the facts. Harlan testified that, after the officers
9
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ANALYSIS 9

A. Defendant's Initial Statements to Law Enforcement
The State acknowledges that Defendant was in custody at the time Officer Topham
questioned him regarding the location of his shotgun, and concedes that Defendant's response to
this question should be suppressed because no Miranda10 warnings preceded it See State's
Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress ("Response") at 5 Consequently, although the
Court does not necessarily agree that Miranda warnings were required prior to Officer Topham's
inquiry, see, e_g_, United States v Lackey, 334 F 3d 1224 (10th Cir 2003) (public safety
exception justified officers m asking defendant, after arrest but prior to giving Miranda warnings,

had confirmed that Defendant was not at the home, he asked Detective Orton if they were done
searching, and that Detective Orton responded that they were not done because Defendant's
bedroom was "a crime scene " Additionally, Harlan testified that, after Detective Bonzo had
been searching Defendant's bedroom for 15-20 minutes, Harlan expressly told Detective Orton
that he wanted the officers to obtain a search warrant According to Harlan, Detective Orton
relayed this information to Detective Bonzo, who said that he only needed to search for a few
more minutes Harlan testified that he then told Detective Bonzo to get a search warrant anyway,
but that Detective Bonzo went back into the room and came out about five minutes later, saying
that the officers would bnng a search warrant by the home the next day, which the officers never
did Defendant's half-sister, Amber Picyavit, gave testimony that was somewhat similar to that
of Harlan, but also somewhat conflicting Suffice it to say that the Court finds the detectives'
testimony to be more credible than that of Harlan and Ms Picyavit
9

Additional facts are included in the discussion below as necessary

10

See Miranda v Arizona, 384 U S 436(1966)
10
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question regarding presence of weapons); State v. Kooyman, 112 P.3d 1252, 1263 (Utah Ct.
App. 2005) (during execution of search warrant, ''officer's brief questions about the presence of
weapons in the home did not implicate Miranda"* where the inquiry was motivated by safety
concerns, and where there was ''nothing precluding a conclusion that the question was 'normally
attendant to . . . custody,v) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)) (other
citations omitted), Defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted as to his initial statement regarding
the shotgun's location.

B. Defendant's Interrogation
1. Defendant's Pre-Miranda Question About Officer Thomas
Defendant argues that his inquiry regarding whether Officer Thomas was alright should
be suppressed because "Defendant had not been given his Miranda rights, was in custody and
was in the process of being interrogated." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress
("Mem. in Supp.") at 6.
In response, the State argues that such inquiry is admissible as a spontaneous, voluntary
statement See Response at 9 (citing State v. Meinhart 617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980); State v.
Easthope, 510 P.2d 933 (Utah 1973)).
Defendant challenges this description, asserting that "in light of the amount of time [he]
was in custody, the length of time [he] was questioned before Miranda rights were given and the
11
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['false friend' and half truth'] tactics[11] used by the interrogating officei, the Defendant s
statements pre- Muanda cannot accurately be described as voluntary or spontaneous " Reply at 3
The question here is whethei Defendant is correct in asseiting that he "was in the piocess
of being interrogated" at the time he asked about Officer Thomas The Court answers this
question in the negative, concluding that, at the time of Defendant's inquiry about Officer
Thomas, Defendant was not "subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent " Koovman 112 P 3d at 1262 (citations and quotation marks omitted)
As stated by the Supreme Court in Rhode Island v Innis, 446 U S 291, 64 L Ed
2d 297, 100 S Ct 1682 (1980), an encounter is considered to be an interrogation
if an officer uses "any words or actions
(other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect " Id_ at 301 Therefore, if a police
officer's questions or comments are "normally attendant to
custody" or are not
"reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response," the Miranda warnings are
not required Id. at 301 Consequently, any statement made by a defendant under
these circumstances is considered voluntary and untainted See id at 301-02
Koovman, 112 P 3d at 1262-63
Nothing that Detective Bleak said or did prior to Defendant asking about Officer Thomas
was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response " Id_ Defendant points to "the amount
of time [he] was in custody," Reply at 3, and "the length of time [he] was questioned before

11

Defendant argues that Detective Bleak "went out of his way to appear as a fnend to the
defendant
by making statements such as CI know there are two sides to every story,'" and by
stating that he was primarily interested in getting Defendant help Reply at 2-3 The latter
statement was made after Defendant had asked whether Officer Thomas was alright
12
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Miranda rights were given," Reply at 3, but he had only been in custody for about an hour and he
had only been asked questions (all of which were permissible)12 for a couple of minutes.
Defendant has presented no authorities holding that Miranda warnings must be given within any
particular time-frame, and the Court cannot conclude that the brief custodial period leading up to
Defendant's inquiry here added significantly to the coercion "inherent in custody itself." State v
James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Interrogation must reflect a greater measure
of compulsion than that inherent in custody itself.") (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479)
Similarly, the Court rejects Defendant's argument that his statement was not voluntary or
spontaneous merely because Detective Bleak said that he knew there were "two sides to every
story."13 Detective Bleak's comment did not call for a response, and he was not expecting one,

12

As the State has noted, all of the pre-Miranda questions asked by Detective Bleak were
typical of questions "normally attendant to arrest and custody." See State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d
422, 426-27 (Utah 1998).
13

Defendant also condemns as a "false friend" or "half truth" tactic Detective Bleak's
statement suggesting that his primary interest was in getting Defendant help. See Reply at 3
(citing State v. Tiedemannu 162 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2007)). It is unclear whether Defendant intends
this argument to apply to his argument that Detective Bleak's "tactics" show that Defendant's
question about Officer Thomas was involuntary, see Reply at 3, but if so, the argument is
rejected. As noted above, Detective Bleak had not yet made this statement at the time Defendant
asked about Officer Thomas, so even assuming that the statement was improper, it could not
have affected the voluntariness of Defendant's question. It is likewise unclear whether
Defendant is arguing that his question was involuntary because Detective Bleak had given him
water, hot chocolate, and a blanket, but if so, this argument is also rejected. See People v. Logan,
797 N.Y.S.2d 634, 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (defendant who was given a blanket, water, and a
cigarette was not coerced or intimidated into making a statement).
13
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as shown by the fact that Defendant interrupted the detective to ask about Officer Thomas
Having reviewed the video of the entire conversation, the Court has no difficulty finding, under
the totality of the circumstances, that Defendant's question about Officer Thomas was indeed
spontaneous and voluntary, and that it is therefore admissible under Miranda itself. See Dutchie,
969 P.2d at 426 (defendant's statements were admissible where they "were voluntary,
spontaneous, and not the product of interrogation") (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). Hence, as
to this statement, the Motion to Suppress is denied.
2. Defendant's Post-Miranda Statements
The next issue raised by Defendant with regard to the interrogation is whether the State
has carried its "heavy burden" of "demonstrating] that [he] knowingly and intelligently waived
his Miranda rights." State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 475) (quotation marks omitted). The Court must "look at the totality of the circumstances to
determine if a suspect has made a valid waiver." Leyva, 951 P.2d at 744 (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
Defendant's argument begins with the following rule:
After an officer has informed a suspect of his Miranda rights and has determined
that the suspect understands those rights, the officer must then determine if the
suspect is willing to waive those rights and answer questions. If the suspect
responds ambiguously or equivocally, the officer must then focus on clarifying the
suspect's intent.
Leyva, 951 P.2d at 744.
14
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Asserting that he said, "Well I don't know

" when Detective Bleak inquired as to

whether he wished to give c[his] side of the story ' Defendant characterizes his response as
ambiguous and equnocal, and aigues that Detective Bleak failed to clarify his intent to waive his
Miranda rights Mem in Supp at 6-7
Defendant's argument is unpersuasive First, Defendant s representation of the facts is
inconect He did not say, "Well, I don't know

" Rather, he said, "Well, it's just like, I don t

know, I've just been hearing a lot of stuff you know7" Taken in context, the "I don't know" was
not an expression of doubt as to whether he wished to give his side of the story, but an expression
of doubt as to how to explain his side of the story 14
Defendant did not explicitly state "yes" or "no" in response to Detective Bleak's question,
but by beginning to tell his side of the story immediately after acknowledging his understanding
of his rights, and by proceeding without objection to answer Detective Bleak's questions, he
clearly indicated his intent to waive his Miranda rights See Leyva, 951 P 2d at 744 (concluding
that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights where, among other things,
defendant responded without hesitation to officer's questions after acknowledging his right not to
do so), State v Barrett, 147 P 3d 491, 495 (Utah Ct App 2006) (stating that "[defendant's]
14

In response to Detective Bleak's very next question ("What kind of stuff9"), Defendant
continued his explanation, and again used the same expression "
[Ijt's like, everything, like
everything is talking to me, like God's talking to me and, it's like (inaudible) over the radio and
stuff and I don't know if it's me putting the heads in my own thought or whatever and stuff, and
just like, I don Y know, it just told me to murder
" (Emphasis added)
15
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admission of guilt immediately after acknowledging that he understood his rights also supports
waiver ), State v Hilfiker, 868 P 2d 826, 831 (Utah Ct App 1994) (defendant s waiver was
knowing and intelligent where among other things,' [h]e acknowledged his rights and still
proceeded to make the incriminating statements") See also United States v Frankson, 83 F 3d
79, 82 (4th Cir 1996) (c [A] defendant's 'subsequent willingness to answer questions after
acknowledging [his] Miranda rights is sufficient to constitute an implied waiver '") (quoting
United States v Velasquez, 626 F 2d 314, 320 (3rd Cir 1980), and citing Cape v Francis, 741
F 2d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir 1984), cert denied, 474 U S 911 (1985), United States v Stark, 609
F 2d 271 (6th Cir 1979))
Defendant argues, however, that the invalidity of his waiver is shown by his subsequent
questions about whether answering the detective's questions would help Defendant or the State
m court, and whether he was giving a confession See Mem in Supp at 7
In response, the State urges application of the rule that once a party has waived his
Miranda rights, he may not invoke such rights without a clear statement See Response at 9
(citing Davis v United States, 512 U S 452 (1994), Leyva, 951 P 2d at 742) According to the
State, Defendant's questions are ambiguous statements that "do not rise to the level of remvocation

" Response at 9

The State s argument does not address the issue raised by Defendant, which is whether
his waiver was valid, not whether he invoked his rights after waiving them See Leyva, 951 P 2d
16

at 743 (uThe questions of waiver of Miranda rights and of postwaiver invocation of those rights
are entirely separate ") (citation omitted) In essence, Defendant appears to be arguing that his
waiver was not knowing and intelligent because he did not sufficiently undeistand its
consequences. See State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1989) C'[T]he waiver [of Miranda
rights] must have been

executed with 'full awareness both of the nature of the right being

abandoned and [of] the consequences of the decision to abandon it'") (quoting Moran v
Burbine, 475 U S. 412, 421 (1986)) (emphasis added) 15
On their face, Defendant's questions as to whether he was giving a confession, and as to
whom he would be helping-himself or law enforcement officers-by answering the detective's
questions cast doubt on whether or not he fully understood "the nature of the right being
abandoned and . . . the consequences of the decision to abandon it " Strain, 779 P.2d at 224.
Of course, the Court may not consider such questions in a vacuum, but must evaluate
them together with the other "facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused " State v Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah
1985) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The difficulty here is that no evidence regarding
Defendant's background and experience was presented at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress.

15

Of course, the waiver of Miranda rights must also be voluntary; that is, it "must have
been the product of a Tree and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or
deception.'" Strain, 779 P.2d at 224 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421). There is no issue here as
to the voluntariness of Defendant's post-Miranda statements.
17

Cf. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236 (defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent where he was "an
intelligent and well-educated person" who had '"graduated from high school, completed two years
of college, and r[isen] to a position of high responsibility at his place of employment"); State v.
Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 429 (Utah 1998) (defendant's waiver was valid where, among other
things, he had significant "prior experience with police and the criminal justice process").16
Defendant's conduct here appears inconsistent. On the one hand, Defendant expressly
affirmed that he understood the Miranda warnings, including that "anything [he] safid] c[ould]
and w[ould] be used in court against [him]." On the other, he subsequently asked whether
responding to questions would "help [him] in court." (Emphasis added.) If Defendant
understood that his statements would be used "against" him in court, it is unclear why he would

16

At the preliminary hearing in this matter, the Court heard evidence that Defendant has
had previous run-ins with the law, including multiple arrests by the very officer he is alleged to
have shot. See April 3, 2007 Preliminary Hearing Transcript (filed April 19, 2007) at 14:2-6
(testimony by Officer Jason Thomas stating that he knew Defendant prior to January 5, 2007
because he had "arrested him a couple of times"). Had such evidence been presented at the
suppression hearing, it may well have weighed in favor of finding that Defendant understood his
rights. See, e^g., Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 429. However, it would be improper to incorporate, sua
sponte, evidence from the preliminary hearing into the suppression hearing. Although "[c]ourts
may take judicial notice of the records and prior proceedings in the same case," Riche v. Riche,
784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted), the facts so noticed must be "not
subject to reasonable dispute . . . ." U.R.E. Rule 201(b). The Court cannot conclude that this
standard is satisfied here, particularly since the Court has received no evidence as to the
underlying reasons for the prior arrests mentioned, or whether Defendant was given Miranda
warnings in connection with such arrests, Cf. United States v. Hall 724 F.2d 1055, 1059 (2d
Cir. 1983) ("[T]here is force in the [trial] judge's observation that [the defendant] knew his rights
all along since he was not a newcomer to the law, and, more important, no newcomer to the
jurisprudence of Miranda.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
18
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have asked if such statements would "help" him m court The obvious explanation is the one
advanced by Defendant he did not understand that his statements would be used against him
Howe\er, this explanation is undermined by the other facts of this case Fust, Defendant
had previously indicated that he understood his statements would be used against him in court
Second, in response to Defendant's question as to whether answering questions would help him
or the police m court, Detective Bleak said, in part,
Dude, I'll be honest with you Honesty goes a long way for everyone involved
I'll tell you that straight up Honesty goes a long way-with the prosecutor, with
the judge-nobody wants to go into court and listen to some b s , dude, ah, ah, and
that's the truth Honesty goes a long way-with me, with-with the judge, with the
prosecutor
Hence, Defendant was reminded that whatever he said would be shared with both the
judge and the prosecutor

17

Third, throughout the interview, m response to a number of Detective

17

The Court acknowledges that it is troubled by the way this reminder was given,
couched as it was m terms of the benefits of being honest See, e g , Hart v AG, 323 F 3d 884,
894 (11th Cir 2003) ('Telling [the defendant] that 'honesty wouldn't hurt him' contradicted the
Miranda warning that anything he said could be used against him in court ") Cf_ State v Strain,
779 P 2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989) ("[A]ppeals to the defendant that full cooperation would be his
best course of action have been recognized as not coercive ") (citation omitted) Had Detective
Bleak simply given straightforward answers to Defendant's questions, it would certainly have
made it easier for the Court to find that Defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent See,
e g , Rice v Cooper, 148 F 3d 747, 752 (7th Cir 1998) (where, during administration of Miranda
warnings, defendant asked what various warnings meant, and where officer then explained the
warnings in simpler terms, and where defendant then indicated that he understood, "[t]his pattern
is consistent with [the defendant's] having, to the best of the police officers' knowledge,
understood the warnings sufficiently to be able to waive them knowingly") Nevertheless, even
assuming that Detective Bleak's responses to Defendant's questions obscured more than they
illuminated, the Court is still persuaded, based on the remaining circumstances here, that
19
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Bleak's questions Defendant simply remained silent, signifying his awareness of his right to
speak only when he chose to do so, and of the fact that speaking might not be in his best interest
See United States v Banks 78 F 3d 1190 1198 (7th Cir 1996) (fact that defendant 4selecti\ely
chose not to answer some of the questions that were put to him" weighed in favor of finding that
he understood his right to remain silent), overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v
Shenod, 445 F 3d 980, 982 (7th Cir 2006) Fourth, at the conclusion of the interview, Detective
Bleak told Defendant that he would be arrested, and that information was going to be given to the
prosecutor and Defendant manifested no surprise, as would be expected if he had mistakenly
understood that his statements were not to be used against him
Based on the totality of the circumstances here, the Court concludes that Defendant's
waiver was knowing and intelligent Although Defendant may not have understood, in the
abstract, whether or not he was giving "a confession," Defendant "understood that he had the
right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used as evidence against him " Colorado
v Spring, 479 U S 564, 574 (1987) Consequently, the Motion to Suppress is denied as to
Defendant's post-Miranda statements
C. Search of Defendant's Bedroom
The dispute with regard to the search of Defendant's bedroom is a factual one See State
v Hansen, 63 P 3d 650, 663 (Utah 2002) ("Consent is a factual finding that should be made
Defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent
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based on the totality of the circumstances."). Defendant claims that his father's consent to a
search of the bedroom was limited to a search for Defendant's person, and did not extend to any
other items. In contrast, the State claims that Defendant's father gave the officers consent to
conduct a thorough search of the room for any criminal evidence. Each side bases its argument
entirely on its own version of the facts, as respectively supported or contested by the different
testimony offered at the suppression hearing.
Having carefully considered the competing testimony, the Court has resolved this dispute
in favor of the State, and therefore finds that the search conducted by the officers was not
constitutionally offensive. "It is well established that consent provides an exception to the
general rule prohibiting warrantless searches." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah
1987) (citations omitted).18 Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress is denied as to the evidence
recovered from Defendant's bedroom.

1

Defendant has not challenged the actual or apparent authority of his father to grant
Detective Orton's request for consent to search Defendant's bedroom. See, e.g., State v. Duran,
131 P.3d 246, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) ("A warrantless search is reasonable if it is conducted
with the consent of the defendant or some other person who 'possesses common authority over
or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."') (quoting
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)); State v. Earl, 92 P.3d 167, 174 (Utah Ct.
App. 2004) ("[E]ven in the absence of actual 'common authority,' if it would be reasonable for
an officer to believe that the [third party] had 'common authority,' pursuant to Matlock, when a
[third party] consents to the warrantless entry, the entry and search will be deemed valid.")
(citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990)). Neither has Defendant asserted that
any consent his father gave was given involuntarily. See, e.g., State v. Humphrey, 138 P.3d 590,
594 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) ("[A] consent which is not voluntarily given is invalid.") (citation
omitted). Because these issues have not been raised, the Court does not address them.
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ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that1. the Motion to Suppress is granted as to
a. Defendant's pre-Miranda statement regarding the shotgun's location; and
2. the Motion to Suppress is denied as to
a. Defendant's pre-Miranda inquiry regarding Officer Thomas;
b, Defendant's post-Miranda statements; and
b. the evidence recovered from the search of Defendant's bedroom.
Dated thi^jjj

day of July, 2008.
BY THE COURT:
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Exhibit C

Excerpts from Testimony of
Christine Tallman

A.

Okay.

Q.

Do -- do you reside here in Cedar City?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And have you lived here for a while?

A.

About four years.

Q.

All right.
And are you related to the

Featherhat?

n

^Y\\V7\\

A.

Yes.

Q.

And how are you related?

A.

Ah, he's my cousin.

Q.

All right.

wC

M

I want to ask you some questions about Mr.
Featherhat and the night of January 5th, 2007; do you
remember that night?
A.

Urn, yeah.

Q.

Okay.
And did you have the chance to, ah, see Mr.

Featherhat's vehicle, ah, stuck in the snow?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.
And describe that.

What were you doing at that

time?
A.

Urn, we were coming from my house, going to my

sister r s house.
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And where do you live?
I live at 634 North 380 West on North Field Road.
In Cedar City?
Yes .
All right.
And who were you with when you were going to see
ter?
I was with my boyfriend and my three kids.
What's your boyfriend's name?
Pedro Hinojosa.
And how -- do you have three children?
Yes .
What are their names.
Dareek Zahne, Dashan Zahne, Macayla Tallman.
And how old were they when this happened?

Do you

?
Ah, I think four, six, and seven.
Okay.

So they were just young children.

Yes .
And whose vehicle were you in?
Pedro's.
What kind of vehicle is it?

Do you remember?

No, I don't.
All right.
I think it was a Honda Passport.
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Q.
Q.

1

Okay.
An SUV type

2
3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.
Q.

All right.

vehicle?

Who was driving?

•5
6

A.

Ah, Pedro w a s .

7

Q.

Where were you seated?

8

A.

A passenger.

9

Q.

And where were your

10

A.

In the back

11

Q.

And where were you headed?

12

A.

To my s :i s ter ' s ho us e .

13

Q.

And where does she live?

A.

Ah, I don't know the address.

by
16

seat.

Q.

P
house..

'

IM •; mi \ ii 111

""id > ; L

20

Q

And where was that at?

21

i!

Right around the corner.

24
25

J ust

--ii

A/a ' t o y o u r

sister's

unusual?

Urn,

\ 'Idres i

iiu .

-=•'- jnything

A.

23

e

All right.

19

22

I

Kolob, those houses.

] 7
18

children?

''.Mji-i

in

i hi-

niifw.

I don't know what the

, but

Q.

If you saw a map, would you be able to identify

A.

Yeah.

it?
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Q.

If I showed you this map here

(Indicated) maybe

you could step down and identify where you were at.

Do you

recognize -- first of all, let me ask you if you recognize
it,

if you can orient yourself to the map.
A.

Can I go down and look at it?

Q.

Yeah.

(Witness complied.)

I believe this is Kolob here
A.

Right around here

Q.

Okay.

(Indicated).

(Indicated).

So the witness has ide n t: :i f j e c:l t: h e i n t e r s e c t i o n o f
600 W e s t a n d .1 3 2 5 N o r t h o n the m a p , Y o u r H o n o r
is

right here

si 1

A n d t: h I s

(Indicated) is where you saw the truck

. ^ sirlp oi the road?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Thank you.

Yo1;

All right.

And wha: J; i yoi; • > when you saw the

.ck.

vehicle stopped by the siae
A.

•*

*>

Urn, we stopped and he askec.

- Bryan asked us if

we could pull him the side of the road cause his truck was,
I th i ii 1! ;: c i 1 1

Df gas and

so

Q.

Where was his truck?

Was it in the middle of the

A.

Ah, kind of like on this side of the road

road?

(Indicated).
Q.

Okay.
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A.

1

And so we pulled over in front of his truck and

2

we didn't have a chain.

3

in back of his truck.

So he started looking for a chain

4

Q.

Did he find one?

5

A.

Ah, yeah.

6

Q.

And what happened next?

7

A.

Urn, he started hookin' up the chain to the truck

8

And we pulled him a little bit forward, just a little, and

9

that's when Officer Thomas pulled up behind him.
I) :i d y c I I s = 3 t: h e 0 f f i c e r p i i J ] :i n

All right.

10

Q.

11

behind?

12

A.

Urn, yeah, cause he turned his lights on.

13

Q.

You knew it was an officer?

1 4

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

I nutted i a t e l y ?

16

A.

Um-hn i

17

Q.

Okay.

Because the l i g h t s

came on so.

Was it dark outside?
A.

Urn, yeah.

Q.

Do vo'ii

A.

No

Q.

But it was dark?

24

A

Yes .

25

Q.

And describe the conditions outside, the weather

(Ju you t e mo ruber, ah, about what time it

was ?
I don ! t.
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A.

It was cold, snowy.

Q.

All right.
And so you -- you were able to pull his vehicle

4

forward a little bit.
A.

5

What happened next?

Urn, that's as far as we coul

>ecause

6

Officer pulled up and he got out and he was talkin' to

7

Bryan in the back.

And --

8

Q.

Did you ijcl nut of your vehicle?

9

A.

Urn, yeah

I did.

I got out.

And I stood there

> nfor a while and the officer i.'uiin- up I <
11

;e asked

or Bryan came up to me and asked me if I could - -

urn,

•

-.^

that I was drivin' him, and I told him 1: i
Q.

Bryan wanted you say you were driving - -

A.

Yeah.

By the time the officer was behind, him so

he heard him, t Q
17

:.: > * .

Did he want you

vehicle or your

to say you were driving his

/ehicle?
vehicle.

18

Yeaii

19

Okay .
se to you?

20
A

21
22

That was it.
And he turned around

. -

aiTh.' lip

to

23

me and asked me for ray ID, and I told him that my ID was

24

home.

25

went Lu Liu- back and he started talking to Bryan.

And he just told me to hang on riqiii t
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Q.

Okay.
And were you still outside of your vehicle?

A.

No.

I got back in.

Q.

Did you get into the passenger side or the

A.

I got in the passenger's side.

Q.

And where were your kids?

A.

They were in the back.

Q.

Of the vehicle?

A.

In the -- yeah.

Q.

Did they stay there the whole time?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

All right.

A

Um, he was on the passenger's side.

Q

In the vehicle?

A.

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

And whe T ^* w.\;: Pedro?

A n d w 1M I h a p p e n e d n e x t ?
A,.
'udden

Urn, t h» " w e r e in the ba<-.- . t a l k i n g , a n d a l l of a
ve h e a r d g u n s h o t s .

:

And i

t of t-h^ t-r-i-iny ^rcj ^

_

•;-

t

"an with my

kids .
Q.

Okay.

Now, when you say you. heard gunshots,

where were you at when you heard gunshots?
A.
the truck.

Oh, I was -- v

'

And when I heard

•
:!

.

s, I was in

J stepped > .' if t. he
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1 || truck.
2 ||

Q.

And can you identify her on this map, do you --

3 || do you recognize that?
4 || what this is

6 ||

(Indicated)?

A,

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

7 ||

Can you kind of orient yourself to

So this -- is this a map of the scene?

8 ||

A.

Um-hm.

9 ||

Q.

And, ah, if this -- if this were Officer Thomas's

10 || vehicle

(Indicated) and this were Bryan Featherhat f s

11 || vehicle, where was, ah, Pedro's vehicle?
12 ||

.A.

i ** II

Q.

Ah, right
Was right here
Yes.

Q.

Facing this way to the west?

A.

Yes.

describing
Q.

her

21

(Indicated)?

A.

THE CO 1JRT :
she's

e ( 1 r i d i c,i! <•• d ) .

(BY MR.

I s :i t c 1 e ar f r oin t he doci iinen t wha t

here?
GARRETT):

I don't

know.

Let

nit* w m i

will)

:> n t h a t: .

II

If this direction is down is, on this map

22 II west, wouJii it in- I ,J i i I n ,,, i

I hat ynui

is

vehicle was parked

directly west of the defendant's vehicle?
THE WITNESS:
Q.

Yes.

And was it facing west,

(Indicated) your vehie] e?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

And was there a chain that ~ - that was

hooking your vehicle or Pedro's v e h i c l e to the
vehicle

defendant's

(Indicated)?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And is that the chain that you had used to tow

the defendant's vehicle to this position?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Mow could you identify on this map -vhe: : B the

defendant's vehicle was when you first saw it?
A.

Um, kind of like where the p a t r o l truck's

parked

(Indicated).
Q.

Okay.

So almost in the same p o s i t i o n as Officer

Thomas " \;r e h i c L e .
A.

Yeah.

Q.

So you p U H e d

i t maybe a car 1 eng th a nci a ha 1 f ;

i 3 that accurate?
A.

Ah, not that far.

It j i ist kind of went up a

J :i 111 e because the t:i i: e started sp:i nning
Q.

Okay.

A.

-- on Pedro's right.

Q

So you were getting stuck, y o u r s e l f .

A

Um-hm.

Q

All right.

a

Even though he had i t in f our -by- f our , tlie t i re
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was just

2

Q.

3
4

spinning.
All right.
And so y o u w e r e s e a t e d in this v e h i c l e ,

v e h i c l e right h e r e

Pedro's

(Indicated) w h e n y o u h e a r d g u n s h o t s .

5

A.

Yeah.

6

Q.

How d i d y o u k n o w they w e r e

7

A.

Urn, y o u c o u l d tell they w e r e g u n s h o t s .

8

Q.

H o w m a n y did y o u hear?

9

A.

I can't r e c a l l .

10

Q.

Where w a s P e d r o w h e n y o u -- w h e n y o u h e a r d the

A.

A h , he w a s on t h e p a s s -

gunshots?

]

. >t , h e

Q.

Iriver's sii-

g o t iiiy

Where did they run to?

-: •

Can you

an

Once
--r ?

t ou

show

^xA *cliio iiiap tut. direction that they went?
A.

Urn, this way

(Indica: v..-,.:) .

Q.

Okay.

A

Towards those apartments that are right in the

She's pointing r

the left side of the

map .
I HI

A 11

corner.
O

All right.
So they

so he ran

he ran, ah, would it be

n< :) i: t:h < : >n across 13 2 5 Nc: > i: th this w a y (Indi cated) ?
24

1!

Ah, yeah..

25

0

Yeah .

11: w o u ] dfae n o r t h

Okay.
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1

So he crossed 1325, going north, into some

2

apartments over here on the

(Indicated) -- which would be

3

on the north side of this map.

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And he had your children with him?

6

A.

Yeah.

7

Q.

Okay.

8
9

And what did you do?
A.

I -- I went into shock.

I was just standing

10

there until I seen Bryan come around with the gun.

11

turned around and I started running and he was telling me,

12

"Let's go.

13

around and I kept running.

14

was, urn, unlashing the chain and he took off in the truck.

Let's drive.

Drive me," and I just turned
And when I glanced back, he

15

Q.

Which truck?

16

A.

Pedro's truck?

17

Q.

He took Pedro's truck.

18

A.

Um-hm.

19

Q.

All right.

20
21

And I

I want to just slow you down a little

bait and kind of walk you through this.

When you first

II heard the gunshots, were you looking in the direction of

22

the gunfire?

23

A.

Urn, when I got out, yeah.

But I couldn't see

24 I anything because Pedro's truck was right there.
25

Q.

So you couldn't see who had fired a gun.
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Did you stand there for a little while?

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

How long would you say, after you heard the

5

I did.

gunshots, you stood there?

6

A.

Ah, maybe 15 seconds.

7

Q.

And were you just standing in the road right here

8

(Indicated) next to your -- next to Pedro's vehicle?
A.

9

10

Yeah.

I had the doors open and I was standing

like right there.
Q.

11

All right.
And you stood there for 15 seconds and then you

12
13
14

A.

Almost 15?

15

Q.

-- indicated that you saw Bryan coming towards

17

A.

Yeah.

18

Q.

Where did he come from?

19

A.

From between the rides.

20

Q.

From these two vehicles --

21

A.

Yeah.

22

Q.

-- positioned on the map

23

A.

His truck and Pedro's truck.

24

Q.

Was he coming on the street side or was he coming

16

25

you?

(Indicated)?

on the snow bank side of the vehicle?
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A.

Ah, like the snow bank, like right --

Q.

Right along here

A.

He didn't come over here

(Indicated)?
(Indicated), like in

between here's his -Q.

In between these vehicles --

A.

-- and here's Pedro's truck.

Q.

-- and then out onto the road.

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.
So he came north between the two vehicles onto --

right onto 1325 North, and came down towards you right in
the middle of the road

(Indicated); --

A.

Um-hm.

Q.

-- is that correct?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And when you saw him, describe what you saw.

A.

Ah, I just saw him running with the gun.

And I

told him -Q.

Can you describe the gun?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

I just -- it was long I think.

And you recognized it as a gun?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

What features about it made you think that it was

a gun?
CERTIFIED OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT
JOSEPH M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR

PAGE

19

A.

Urn, cause I seen it.

Q.

A barrel?

A.

I can't really describe how it looked.

just like long.
"Let's go.

A -It was

And he started yelling to me, saying,

Drive me."

And that's when I turned around and

I ran towards the kids.
Q.

How close were you to the defendant, at this time

when he was approaching you with the gun?
A.

Urn, kind of like right around the vehicle, like

just approaching the vehicle in the back.
Q.

From me to you

A.

Ah, yeah.

Q.

This close?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

All right.

(IndicatedO?

Maybe 5 feet?

And then you turned and ran.

Which

way did you run?
A.

I ran towards where Pedro had ran with my kids.

Q.

Do you catch up to hem?

A.

Urn, yes.

Q.

And where did you go to?

A.

We stayed there for a while and I told Pedro, I

said, "We need a phone.

We need a phone," and he gave me

his cell phone and I dialed 911.
Q.

When you were -- when you were -- when you caught

up with Pedro over here

(Indicated), could you still see
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Pedro's vehicle out in the road?
A.

Urn, by that time it took off.

Q.

Did you see it take off?

A.

Um-hm.

Q.

And what -- describe exactly what you saw.

A.

Urn, I saw Bryan.

Well, when I was running from

the vehicle, when Bryan came around with the gun, I started
rung.

And when I looked back, he was, urn, undoing the

chain?
Q.

So the chain was still hooked up between Pedro's

vehicle and the defendant's vehicle

(Indicated).

A.

Yes.

Q.

So Mr. Featherhat, the defendant, had to unhook

the chain.
A.

Um-hm.

Q.

And then what next?

A.

Then he took off in it.

Q.

Took off in Pedro's vehicle?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Do you know which direction he was going?

A.

Ah, no.

Q.

Straight down on this map?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So he was headed west?

A.

Um-hm.

I just seen him go straight to where --
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1

Q.

2

All right.
Did you see him again after

that?

3

A.

No, I didn't.

4

Q.

And then what you did you do, over here with

5

Pedro and your

kids?

6

A.

Urn, there was these people that were

7

their house.

8

into their house, and so we went in there.

They told us how we could go take my kids

9

Q.

And you stayed

10

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did you call the

12

A.

Yes, I did.

13

Q.

Ho that come you called the police?

11

II

14
15
16

there?

police?

What

were

y o u trying to report?
A.

Ah, saying that there was a shooting and

B r y a n took off on the

that

truck.

17

Q.

18

Pedro's

19

A.

No, I didn't.

20

Q.

Did you hear if Pedro gave Bryan

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

No,

23

A.

N o , he did not.

24 I

Q.

So Bryan took the -- Pedro's vehicle

25

outside

Did, ah -- did you give Bryan permission to take
vehicle?

you didn't hear?

permission?

Or no, he did not?

without

permission.
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A.

Yeah.

Q.

All right.
And did you -- are you the one that spoke with

the police?
A.

Urn, I spoke with a 911 dispatcher.

Q.

Did you report the vehicle stolen?

A.

I just said that he went and took off on it.

Q.

Okay.
How come you, ah, ran away from Bryan?

A.

I got scared.

Q.

And how come you were scared?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Do you know, ah, if that night, were you -- were

Just what happened, and he had a

gun .

you ever in close proximity to Bryan?

I mean within a

couple of feet of him that night during that stop?
A.

Like talking to him?

Q.

Um-hm.

A.

Urn, I can't recall.

Q.

Do you know if he'd been consuming alcohol?

A.

Ah, when he came up to me, saying that for me to

tell the officer that I was driving, yes, I could smell
alcohol on him.
Q.

All right.
A strong odor of alcohol?
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A.

Um-hm.

Q.

Did you see him drinking any alcohol?

A.

Urn, no.

Q.

And do you recognize the defendant here today?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Can you identify him for the record?

A.

Bryan Featherhat.

Q.

And where is he located?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Where?

A.

There

Q.

You're pointing to the man, the gentlemen dressed

In the courtroom?

(Indicated).

in the blue suit here -A.

Yes.

Q.

-- at counsel table?

A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.
And he's your cousin?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And he's the one that you saw coming at you with

a gun that night.
A.

Yes.
MR, GARRETT:

Okay.

I have nothing further at

this time, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.
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1

Mr. Burns, you may cross

2

MR. BURNS:

Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS

3
4

examine.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. BURNS:

5

Q.

Bryan is your cousin; is that

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Have you had -- do you know him very well

8

before, ah, this

correct?

night?

9

A.

Ah, no.

10

Q.

Did you spend much time with him at

11

from

family

functions or events?

12

A.

Ah, I used to drink with him once in a while.

13

Q.

When -- when you were first stopped to help and

14

you recognized him, ah, on the side of the road and

15

why you stopped to help; is that

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And, ah, were

that's

correct?

-- were you at all afraid, ah, -

18

during the process of helping him move his vehicle from the

19

road?

Afraid of Bryan?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Did you, ah -- and then, ah, you testified

22

during this - - during this course, urn, that you

23

Bryan shooting at Officer T h o m a s ; is that

24

25

A.

I didn't say that I witnessed.

that

witnessed

correct?
I said that I

heard the gunshots.
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1

Q.

2

A.

3

Q.

4

You h e a r d them?
Yes.

A n d -- and t h e n , a h , a f t e r h e a r i n g the s h o t s ,

d i d -- did B r y a n talk to you?

5

A.
go.

7

t o w a r d s my k i d s .

8

Drive m e . "

Q.

A n d t h a t ' s w h e n I t u r n e d a r o u n d and I r a n

So he w a s -- h e w a s t a l k i n g to y o u .

"Let's g o .

9

A h , drive m e . "

10

me?"

11

w h a t he said?

12

A.

Urn, he said,
THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS:
me.

16

H e said,

D i d he s a y , "Will y o u d r i v e

D i d he just say, "Drive m e . "

13

15

D i d he say a n y t h i n g to y o u ?

N Q . He just r a n t o w a r d s m e , t e l l i n g h i m , "Let's

6

"Let's g o . "

Do y o u r e m e m b e r

exactly

Can I swear?

J u s t a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n .
H e said,

"Let's g o .

Fucking

drive

Let ' s g o . "
Q.

17
18

Okay.

(BY M R . B U R N S ) :

Okay.

A h , a n d then d i d he ask y o u to g e t in the v e h i c l e
II w i t h h i m to d r i v e ?

Do y o u r e m e m b e r

that?

19

A.

Urn, n o .

2 0 I!

Q.

You

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Do you remember, ah, did you -- did you get in

don't

remember

that?

23 I t h e v e h i c l e to d r i v e h i m ?
24

A.

2 5 II

Q.

No.

Okay.
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1

Did -- did he ever point the gun at you?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Were you afraid that: he was gonna shoot at you?

4

A.

Urn, no.

5
6

I just got scared because he had the gun

and what went on.
Q.

7

Okay.
Did you feel like he was -- did you feel

8

threatened, ah, as to your personal safety at that time

9

when he was asking to take the car?

(No verbal response.)

10

When you -- when you turned and -- why didn't you get in

11

the car and drive him?

12

A.

Because I didn't want to.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

And when you turned and ran the other direction

15

away from him, were you afraid that he was gonna shoot at

16

you or did you just not want to be involved in what just a

17

happened?

18
19
20

A.

Urn, I kind of thought like that, but at the same

time I -- I was just scared.
Q.

21

Okay.
Were you afraid, urn, that you were never gonna

22

see your car again?

Did you think that he'd -- was it his

23

intent to steel your car?

Do you know, on talking to him?

24 II

A.

He took off on it.

25

Q.

Okay.

I didn't give him permission.
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Excerpts from Testimony of
Pedro Hinojosa

INTERPRETER:

Yes, because I had already pulled

it once.
Q.

And did it remain connected during the entire

stop while the officer was there?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

Yes.

I want you to identify it then where you were

standing when you first heard a gunshot.
INTERPRETER:

I was here on this side right here

(Indicated).
Q.

And he's pointing in to the middle of the road

right next to where his vehicle would be on 1325 North
(Indicated).

And is this location in Cedar City?

INTERPRETER:
Q.

Yes.

All right.
And so could you tell where the gunshots were

coming from when you heard them?
INTERPRETER:

From behind here

(Indicated) from

where the officers' patrol truck was.
Q.

But you couldn't see any - - you couldn't see the

individuals involved?
INTERPRETER:

I didn't see anything.

Just when I

heard the shots, I ran.
Q.

What was blocking your view here
INTERPRETER:

there.

Bryan's pickup.

(Indicated)?

That was right

(Indicated).
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So after you heard the shots fired, did you run

1

Q.

2

immediately?

3

J!

4

INTERPRETER:

running on the other side, too

5

Q.

6
7

From this side like this

(Indicated) he came out.
Q.

9

Okay.
So he -- he came between the front of his truck

and the back of your truck.

11

INTERPRETER:

12
13

(Indicated).

Show us where Bryan came from.
INTERPRETER:

8

10

I ran because I saw that he was

Q.

Yes.

Describe what you saw when -- when Bryan

appeared.

14

INTERPRETER:

Okay.

15

When he appeared, he appeared screaming

16

something, and I could not understand because I don't

17

understand English.

18

he had.

19 If

Q.

20

He knelt down and he threw the weapon

He put it on the ground.
Can you describe the weapon?
INTERPRETER:

21

this

(Indicated).

22

the vehicles.

23

Q.

It's a short weapon, short like*

It's black.

I saw with the light from

You were going like this

24

the weapon.

25

motion?

(Indicated) describing

What are you describing there with that
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THE COURT:

Mr. Garrett, maybe you should

describe that motion.
Q.

(BY MR. GARRETT):

Well, it's kind of a downward

motion like a curve maybe in the weapon.
INTERPRETER:

It was not a normal long straight

weapon like the other ones.

It was curved like this

(Indicated).
Q.

Do you know what kind of gun it was?
INTERPRETER:

Not exactly.

I have seen weapons

like that, but I don't know exactly what type it is.
Q.

Would it be fair to describe it as a pistol grip?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Yes.

Okay.
And, ah, he knelt down and put the gun on the

ground.

What happened next?
INTERPRETER:

He unhooked the chain, he took his

weapon and he got in my vehicle and he drove off.
Q.

Where were you when he put the gun down and

unhooked the vehicle?
INTERPRETER:

With the children on the side of

the vehicle, starting to run.
Q.

Did you get the children out of the vehicle?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Yes.

How come?
INTERPRETER:

Because of fear.
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very frightened.

I was afraid that he would do something

to him, to the children.

I don't know what could have

happened.
Q.

So did you physically take the children out of

the vehicle?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

'em out.

Yes.

And where did you run to?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

I took

And did you grab their hands and run?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Yes.

Towards the apartments.

And did you see if -- what happened to your

vehicle?
INTERPRETER:

He took it.

He stole it from me.

He took it.
Q.

Did you give him permission to take your vehicle?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Did you want him to take your vehicle?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

No.

Was it okay that he took your vehicle?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

No.

No.

And so what did you do next, after you ran over

with the children over here
INTERPRETER:

(Indicated)?

When we left, what we did is I

tried -- I tried to tell my girlfriend, but she didn't
understand me.

But I tried to tell her to call, but she
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called anyway.
0.

Called who?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Okay.
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Ah, the police.

Okay.

Called the police.

You can sit down.

Thank you.

When was the next time you saw your vehicle?
INTERPRETER:

I saw it again, a week later, I saw

my vehicle.
Q.

So you didn't get it back for a week.
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Was that your only vehicle?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Yes.

Yes.

How did you get around during that -- that week

you didn't have your vehicle?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

I get rides.

All right.
I want to show you what's been marked as State's

Exhibit No. 41 and No. 42.

Do you recognize this

photograph No. 41?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

What is it?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Yes.

It's my vehicle.

Okay.
And -- and photograph No. 42?
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INTERPRETER:
Q.

It is my vehicle.

How do you know that?
INTERPRETER:

know my whole vehicle
Q.

I know it.

I know this part.

I

(Indicated).

Okay.
Now, did you -- did you, ah -- you already

indicated you did not know Mr. Featherhat
INTERPRETER:
Q.

(Indicated),

No.

Did you have any, ah, shotgun shells in your

vehicle the night this happened?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

No.

Do you own a shotgun?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

No.

Can you identify the defendant here in the

courtroom today?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

It's him?

Seated left of counsel here in the blue suit?
INTERPRETER:

Yes.

MR. GARRETT:

All right.

That's all I have, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Burns, you may cross examine.
CROSS

EXAMINATION

BY MR, BURNS:
Q.

Thank you.
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1
2

From the times that you -- from the time that you
first heard the shots, what did you then start to do?

3

INTERPRETER:

When I heard the shots, I turned

4

back to look where they were coming from and then I ran to

5

get the children.

6

Q.

Where were you standing when you first heard the

7

shots in relation to your vehicle and Bryan Featherhat's

8

vehicle?

9
10
11

INTERPRETER:
Q.

I was on the side of my vehicle.

And so you say you ran to get the kids, does that

mean you took a step towards your vehicle?

12

INTERPRETER:

13

Q.

14

the vehicle?

Yes.

I walked towards my vehicle.

How long did it take you to remove the kids from
Do you know?

15

INTERPRETER:

16

I don't know exactly, because I didn't measure

17

the time.

Okay.

But I moved as fast as I could because there was

18 II three of them and they were heavy and there was snow.
19
20

But

I don't know exactly how much time it took.
Q.

21

Okay.
You testified that Bryan Featherhat -- that Bryan

22

approached you and was talking to you excitedly; is that

23

correct?

24
25

INTERPRETER:

No.

I never said he was excited

when he came towards me, or do you mean when he asked help
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or when he ran?
Q.

When -- after you heard the shots, you were then

in the process of taking the children out of the vehicle;
is that correct?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

Yes.

And some time near to that time, Bryan approached

the vehicle.
INTERPRETER:
Q.

It was when he ran with the weapon.

Okay.
And he was saying something to you; is that

correct?
INTERPRETER:

He would say something.

I don't

know exactly what he would say because I don't understand,
but he would say something.
Q.

Okay.
Was he pointing the gun at you when he was saying

it?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

No.

What -- when he said something to you, what was

your response?

Did you respond to him?

INTERPRETER:

No.

Nothing.

I kept running.

I

didn't do anything.
Q.

Okay.
You testified that you watched him set the gun

down.
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INTERPRETER:

Yes.

I saw him put the gun down on

the ground when he, ah, unhooked the chain.
Q.

Was that before or after he had said something to

you?
INTERPRETER:

First he says something.

First he

came screaming, saying something, and then he put it on the
ground.
Q.

Where were the kids when he put the shotgun on

the ground?
INTERPRETER:
towards the apartment.
Q.

The children, I was taking them
I was taking them.

So you already had them out of the vehicle at

that time?
INTERPRETER:

Yes.

When he was screaming, I

already had the children.
Q.

Were you afraid?
INTERPRETER:

Q.

Lots.

And why were you afraid?
INTERPRETER:

shots like that.

I thought I have already been in

In Mexico once I was in an exchange of

shots and I was afraid that I would get hit.
Q.

Were -- were you afraid because he pointed the

gun at you?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

No.

He didn't point at me.

After he got done talking to you, were you afraid
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that he was going to shoot at you?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

Yes.

After he set the gun down, were you afraid that

he was going to shoot at you?
INTERPRETER:

I was afraid.

I was running.

I

was afraid that he would want me to help him out or
something.
Q.

So you were afraid that he was going -- you were

afraid to become any more involved in what had just
happened; is that correct?
INTERPRETER:

Yes.

Well, yes, because I had

nothing to do with what had happened.
Q.

Do you know, ah, you testified it took about a

week for you to get your vehicle back.
INTERPRETER:
Q.

Yes.

Do you know where the vehicle was during that

week?
INTERPRETER:
Q.

The police had it.

Do you -- do you -- were you informed as to when

they first got it back?
INTERPRETER:

They recovered it in the morning

like at 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. they told me they had recovered
it .
Q.

Was there anything missing out of your vehicle

when you got it back?
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Exhibit D

INSTRUCTION NO.

10

Before you may find Defendant BRYAN FEATHERHAT guilty of the offense of Attempted
Aggravated Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended Information, the State must prove and
you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following
elements:
1.

That the Defendant intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the death of Jason

Thomas; and
2.

That the attempted homicide was committed:
A.

Incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during

which the actor committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery; or
B.

For the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the Defendant or

another by a peace officer acting under color of legal authority; or
C.

Against a peace officer, or law enforcement officer, and the officer was either

on duty or the attempted homicide was based on, or was related to, that official position, and the
actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the officer held that official position;
3.

The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant has put into issue; and

4.

That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah.

If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements,
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Attempted Aggravated Murder as charged
in Count 1 of the Amended Information. If the State has proved, however, each and every one of
the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find
the Defendant guilty of Attempted Aggravated Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended
Information.

000408

INSTRUCTION NO.

11

If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant is not guilty of Attempted Aggravated
Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended Information, you must acquit him of that charge. In
that event you must next consider the lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault. The State must
prove and you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the
following elements before you can find Defendant BRYAN FEATHERHAT guilty of Aggravated
Assault:
1.

That the Defendant acted knowingly or intentionally;

2.

That the Defendant did commit an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused

serious bodily injury to another;
3.

The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant put into issue; and

4.

That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah.

If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements,
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Aggravated Assault, a lesser included
offense. If the State has proved, however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to your
satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of
Aggravated Assault, a lesser included offense.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

12

Before you mayfindDefendant BRYAN FE ATHERHAT guilty of the offense of Aggravated
Robbery as charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information, the State must prove and you must find,
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements:
1.

That the Defendant unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take personal

property in the possession of another from his or her person, or immediate presence, against his or
her will, by means offeree or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently
or temporarily of the personal property;
2.

That, in the course of committing the robbery, the Defendant: (a) used or threatened

to use a dangerous weapon; or (b) took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle;
3.

The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant has put into issue; and

4.

That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah.

If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements,
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in Count 2
of the Amended Information. If the State has proved, however, each and every one of the foregoing
elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the
Defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information.

000408

INSTRUCTION NO.

\l

If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant is not guilty of Aggravated Robbery as
charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information, you must acquit him of that charge. In that event
you must next consider the lesser included offense of Theft. The State must prove and you must
find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements
before you can find Defendant BRYAN FEATHERHAT guilty of Theft:
1.

That the Defendant obtained or exercised^control over the property of another;

2.

That the Defendant had a purpose to deprive the owner thereof;

3.

That said property was a motor vehicle;

4.

The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant put into issue; and

5.

That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah.

If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements,
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Theft, a lesser included offense. If the State
has proved, however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond
a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of Theft, a lesser included
offense.

000403

INSTRUCTION NO.

14

If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant is not guilty of Theft, you must acquit him
of that charge In that event, you must next consider the lesser included offense ot Unauthorized

lb?

Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time Jbm State must prove and you must find,
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements before
you can find Defendant BRYAN FEATHERHAT guilty of Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle
for an Extended Time
1

That the Defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over a motor vehicle

of another without the owner's or lawful custodian's consent,
2

That the Defendant acted with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful

custodian of possession of the motor vehicle,
3

That the Defendant did not return the motor vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian

within 24 hours after the exercise of unlawful control,
4.

The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant put into issue, and

5.

That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah

If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements,
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle
for an Extended Time, a lesser included offense If the State has proved, however, each and every
one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty
to find the Defendant guilty of Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time, a
lesser included offense.
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F

' M H DISTRICT COURT

2003 HOY 20 P H 3 : f n
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND F
STATE OF UTAH

UNTY,

VERDICT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRYAN FEATHERHAT,

Criminal No. 071500011
Judge G. Michael Westfall

Defendant.

We, the jury duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, find as follows:
Count 1: ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER
A.

That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of Attempted Aggravated
Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended Information.

YES
OR
B.

That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of the lesser included
offense of Aggravated Assault.

YES
OR

That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is not guilty of Attempted
Aggravated Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended Information, as the
offense is unproven by the burden of evidence required, and not guilty of the lesser
included offense of Aggravated Assault.

YES
nnn/o/

OR

That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is not guilty, by reason of insanity.
of Attempted Aggravated Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended
Information, as the offense is unproven by the burden of evidence required, and not
guilty, by reason of insanity, of the lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault.

YES

Count 2: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of Aggravated Robbery as
charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information.

YES
OR
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of the lesser included
offense of Theft.

YES
OR
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of the lesser included
offense of Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time.

YES
OR
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is not guilty of Aggravated Robbery
as charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information, as the offense is unproven by the
burden of evidence required, and not guilty of the lesser included offenses of Theft
and Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time.

YES
OR
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is not guilty, bv reason of insanity.
of Aggravated Robbery as charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information, as the

offense is unproven by the burden of evidence required, and not guilty, by reason
of insanity, of the lesser included offenses of Theft and Unauthorized Control of a
Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time.

YES
The jury foreperson should mark only one "yes," for each count, on this jury verdict.
DATED this ^ — A V

day of November, 2008.

FOREPERS

r

X

K

CONCURRING JURORS:
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DIS f TMCJ|^gklOURT
IRON COUNTY, STATE^fi J P ^ f i PH 3- 01
1

IKON COUNTY

-

^

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 071500011

BRYAN FEATHERHAT,

Judge G. Michael Westfall

Defendant.

Check one of the following verdicts for each count:
Count 1: ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER

/

We, the jury in the above case, having unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crime of Attempted Aggravated Murder, or the lesser
included crime of Aggravated Assault, also unanimously find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the Defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime.
We, the jury in the above case, having unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crime of Attempted Aggravated Murder, or the lesser
included crime of Aggravated Assault, also unanimously find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant was not mentally ill at the time of the crime.

Count 2: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
We, the jury in the above case, having unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crime of Aggravated Robbery, or the lesser included
crimes of Theft or Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended
Time, also unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime.
We, the jury in the above case, having unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crime of Aggravated Robbery, or the lesser included
crimes of Theft or Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended
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Time, also unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Defendant was not mentally ill at the time of the crime.

^

f

DATED t h i s ^ . — ^

//i
day of November, 200& k _
{

FOREPERSON
CONCURRING JURORS:

./?

i

-

\

\

